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I. Introduction
Campaign finance reform protects the integrity of the American political-
governmental process. But, campaign finance reform measures have not been
analyzed with this understanding. The republican form of government-the
heart of American governance-reflects a principle of power derived from the
people. In the modem American republic, this power is entrusted to elected
representatives in a central government, acting in the best interest of the people.
The overwhelming power of money in the political process threatens this
unique system of government. The states and federal government have
responded to this problem with campaign finance reform, in order to reduce the
power of money in politics, and to make candidates and elected officials more
directly responsive to the people. Campaign finance reform thus can protect
the republican form of government upon which the nation was founded.
The United States Constitution established a republican form of
government and put it front and center. In addition to the republican structure
of the federal government itself, the Guarantee Clause of the United States
Constitution contains an affirmative obligation to ensure this form operates in
the states: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government."' Particularly since 1849 and Luther v.
Borden,2 when the Supreme Court held Guarantee Clause claims to be
nonjusticiable political questions, the Clause has been lost in ajudicial vacuum.
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
2. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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But, the Courts should not treat the Guarantee Clause as a dead letter. While
the Court has recused itself from enforcing the Clause, it has never held that the
Clause is not a legitimate basis for congressional action. In fact, Congress has
both the expertise and experience to enforce the Guarantee Clause and to
resolve the political matters it implicates. Accordingly, this Article posits that
Congress should enact campaign finance reform under its Guarantee Clause
mandate to protect the republican form of government in the states. 3 By
invoking the Guarantee Clause, this Article proposes a new way to approach
the debate over campaign finance reform, based upon Congress's Guarantee
Clause obligation. It ultimately proposes that Congress enact a law enabling
the states to pass measures to limit the influence of money in politics. The ideal
is to adjust the focus of politicians and the balance of power, from the few with
access to big money, to the many, the people.
But, there are restrictions on legislating in this area. The First
Amendment, as applied by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo,4 limits
governments' ability to enact campaign finance reform measures, typically
requiring such laws to survive strict scrutiny.5 While the debates about
3. In a related vein, last year the Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, 47
U.S.C.) [hereinafter BCRA]. The BCRA is also known as the Shays-Meehan or McCain-
Feingold bill. The BCRA eliminates soft money fundraising and spending for candidates by
national political parties. BCRA § 101(a). (As compared with "hard money," which is
regulated under contribution limits and designated for particular candidate accounts, soft money
is unregulated cash that goes to unlimited activities.) The BCRA also increases individual
contribution limits, and it increases the allowance of contributions for nonwealthy candidates
who are opposed by wealthy candidates who use their private wealth to fund their campaign. Id.
§ 319(a). The BCRA also restricts "electioneering communications," prohibiting all
corporations (including those that are tax-exempt) from paying for ads that mention federal
candidates within 60 days of a general election (or within 30 days of a primary). Id. § 201(a).
The law also increases the contribution limits on individual contributions of hard money to
campaigns. Id. § 307. BCRA includes an expedited judicial review provision, id. § 403(a), and
it has been challenged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm 'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2268 (2003).
The three-judge panel found some parts of BCRA constitutional and others unconstitutional, but
the decision was widely split between the judges, with no clear majority. The Supreme Court
heard oral argument on the case on September 8, 2003. Fed. Election Comm'n v. McConnell,
123 S. Ct. 2268 (2003).
The law nominally regulates state-level activities, only regulating state and local
fundraising directed towardfederal election activities. BCRA § 101(a). The law amends the
prevailing federal statute and regulates exclusively federal election activities-and not the
states. Further, in passing this legislation, the Congress did not act explicitly or implicitly under
the Guarantee Clause. Accordingly, this Article does not contain any further discussion of this
new legislation.
4. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
5. Id. at 16.
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campaign finance reform and Buckley have never considered the Guarantee
Clause mandate to protect states' republican forms of government, Congress's
invocation of the Guarantee Clause in passing campaign finance reform does
not make the First Amendment concerns disappear. We need to reconcile the
Guarantee Clause's affirmative obligation upon Congress with free speech
concerns. This Article will show that when the new balance is struck, the
Guarantee Clause mandate to preserve the republican form of government shifts
the present balance against restrictions on campaign expenditures and validates
reasonable reform efforts. Such analysis concludes that acting to protect the
republican form of government, a duty imposed upon Congress by the
Constitution itself, can satisfy strict First Amendment scrutiny under Buckley.
This Article proceeds in four stages. Part II considers the meaning of the
Guarantee Clause itself, identifying popular sovereignty as the core of the
republican form of government. This Part further highlights the role of
representatives, acting in the best interest of the people, as central in this
system. Part I details the interpretation and enforcement of the Guarantee
Clause. We first will see that the courts have declined to interpret the political
questions raised under the Clause, thus leaving the obligation to the Congress.
Beyond that, this Part will show that Congress has both the expertise and the
experience to enforce the Guarantee Clause mandate.
With the meaning of the Clause and its method of enforcement elucidated,
the Article next presents our specific problem: Big money in the political
process results in an elected government primarily responsive to the few and
not to the many. Part IV therefore looks at efforts to achieve campaign finance
reform and how they have fared in the courts. This discussion naturally starts
with Buckley and its progeny, followed by a review of state reform efforts.
While many states and localities have attempted to preserve the responsiveness
of government to the people, many campaign finance reform efforts have run
aground on the shoals of Buckley. In Part V, the Article presents a plan of
action. Pursuant to its Guarantee Clause mandate, Congress should pass a
statute enabling the states to engage in meaningful campaign reform to limit the
influence of money in politics. Such action would protect the republican form
of government in the states. The proposal does not so much challenge Buckley
as throw additional weight into the balance struck by the Court there, which
requires campaign reform to serve a compelling governmental interest for it to
survive a constitutional challenge. The constitutional mandate to preserve the
republican form of government in the states would shift the conclusion reached
in Buckley and its progeny: This campaign reform would survive constitutional
scrutiny.
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
These two areas-the Guarantee Clause and campaign finance reform--
are fairly static, albeit for different reasons. Approaching campaign finance
reform from the Guarantee Clause perspective will animate a debate that has
been stultified by using a central constitutional provision that has been
unnecessarily moribund.
II. The Guarantee Clause and the Essence of the American Republic
This Part explores the Guarantee Clause itself, revealing that in a republic
the power derives from the people.6 In the republic created by the Framers,
popular sovereignty is effectuated by representatives in government. The
voters elect their representative, who is to use his or her best judgment to
represent the entire community. Elected community representation thus is
central to the Guarantee Clause.
The first three Articles of the Constitution establish and define the
Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches-the structure of government
itself.7 Relatively little attention has been paid to Article IV, Section 4, which
contains the key description, "Republican." This provision further offers a
command that, coupled with the republic established in the previous three
articles, promised that the entire nation-federal and state governments-
always would be republican Thus, by its own terms the Guarantee Clause
promised that the national government would ensure that the states maintain a
form of government consistent with that which the Constitution created for the
6. See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1121 (5th rev. ed. 1984)
(defining a republic as "a state in which the supreme power rests in the body of citizens entitled
to vote and is exercised by representatives chosen directly or indirectly by them").
7. The three branches of government and the resulting checks and balances are also
important to republican government, but legislative, executive andjudicial powers were not, in
and of themselves, new. The Framers went beyond these pre-existing structures to create a new
type of government-a republic. Nonetheless, the Guarantee Clause speaks to the structure and
form of representative government, as reflected in its textual placement. See also Ann Althouse,
Time for the Federal Courts to Enforce the Guarantee Clause?-A Response to Professor
Chemerinsky, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 881, 881, 883 (1994) (arguing that "Professor Chemerinsky
must work hard to coax the Guarantee Clause out of the category of constitutional provisions
relating to the structure of government and into the individual rights category" and that "the
Guarantee Clause is what the majority of scholars have taken it to be, a structural safeguard").
8. One practical reason for the Guarantee Clause was far clearer at the time of the
Constitutional Convention than it is today. As originally created, the United States Senate was
chosen by the legislatures of the respective states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. I. This structure
was altered by a constitutional amendment that furthered the popular sovereignty notion by
making Senators subject to popular election. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1. But the reality of
state legislative involvement in the selection of the key chamber in the new national government
gave the United States a vested interest in the forms of state government.
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national government. No specific requirements were laid out, but the
commitment was clear in the words: "The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." 9
Before the United States can fulfill its Guarantee Clause mandate, it must
identify what is protected. Although the Guarantee Clause makes a powerful
declaration of the United States promise to the states, the term "republican" is
not further defined in the text. The Framers discussed the matter but reached
no agreement on its meaning at the time'0 or what it might mean in the future."'
In addition to reviewing the Framers' ideas, we will explore constitutional
history, executive branch determinations, judicial interpretations, and scholarly
opinion in the area. Such a review will show that, while there are many
perspectives, the republic serves the people via representatives exercising their
best judgment in a central government.12
This exploration begins in the founding era. The Framers worked out the
new government by reviewing, accepting and rejecting other principles of
governance from history and their present-day experience. The new
government incorporated ancient historical lessons, 3 more recent trends in
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
10. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 13 (1972)
("Thus the word 'republican' may well not have had any single and universal denotation to the
men who inserted it into the guarantee clause. It may, in fact, have had no meaning at all."). As
discussed in this Part, although the concept of a republic is capacious and hard to define with
absolute precision, it is hardly devoid of meaning.
IH. In 1807 John Adams wrote: "I confess I never understood it, and I believe no man
ever did or ever will." Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren, July 20, 1807, in 4
COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 332,353 (Boston, The Society, 5th
ser. 1878). See also WIECEK, supra note 10, at 72 ("In 1787 no man could predict with certainty
how the clause would evolve.").
12. One argument is that the very indeterminate nature of the term and the lack of clarity
when the Constitution was written suggest a varying meaning with varying times. See, e.g., G.
Edward White, Reading the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 787, 803 (1994) (arguing
that the varied interpretations of the Guarantee Clause show that "it has been whatever a
dominant group of interpreters, at any one point in time, has chosen to make of it"). But, as it
tries to assign clearer meaning to the Clause, this Article contrasts with White's position.
13. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 18, at 122 (James Madison with Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Among the confederacies of antiquity the most considerable was
that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From the best
accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution it bore a very instructive analogy to the
present Confederation of the American States."); JOHN ADAMS, A Defence of the Constitutions
of Government of the United States of America, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS
121 (George A. Peek ed., 1954) [hereinafter ADAMS, Defence]. Adams wrote:
Nothing ought to have more weight with America to determine her judgment
against mixing the authority of the one, the few, and the many confusedly in one
assembly than the widespread miseries and final slavery of almost all mankind in
consequence of such an ignorant policy in the ancient Germans.
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governance, 14 and a mixed view of the system in England." In designing a new
governmental structure, the Framers specifically rejected two forms, monarchy
and aristocracy.' 6 For example, in the Constitutional Convention, Edmund
Randolph expressed the belief that "a republican government must be the basis
of our national union; and no state in it ought to have it in their power to
change its government into a monarchy." ''7 In the ratification debates in
Pennsylvania, James Wilson argued that there are but three forms of
government: Monarchy, aristocracy and a republic or democracy, but as the
only form that left power in the hands of the people, only the last was suitable
for the new nation.'8 Thomas Paine pointedly distinguished the new
Id; THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Hamilton
argued:
It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without
feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were
continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were
kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.
Id.
14. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 100 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[E]ven in modem Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no
example is seen of a government wholly popular and founded, at the same time, wholly on that
principle."); THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison wrote:
What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form?... Holland, in
which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has passed
almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been
bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the people is
exercised in the most absolute manner by a small body of hereditary nobles.
Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has
been dignified with the same appellation.
Id.; JOHN ADAMS, Novanglus; or a History of the Dispute with America, from Its Origin, in
1754, to the Present Time, in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 147, 226 (C.
Bradley Thompson ed., 2002) [hereinafter ADAMS, Novanglus] ("The governments of France,
Spain, etc., are not empires but monarchies .... The British government is still less entitled to
the style of an empire. It is a limited monarchy.").
15. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240-41 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
196 1) ("The government of England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an
hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has with equal impropriety been frequently placed on the
list of republics.").
16. For example, John Adams compared the new American republic with monarchies and
aristocracies, looking to ancient Greek and Roman government, as well as more recent
aristocracies in Holland, Venice, and Berne. See ADAMS, Defence, supra note 13, at 109-12,
119-21; ADAMS, Novanglus, supra note 14, at 226-27.
17. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIONS OF 1787, at 206 (Yates, I I June) (Max
Farrand rev. ed., 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS].
18. 2 THE DEBATES [N THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 433 (James Wilson) (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co., Jonathan
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government from a monarchy, even citing a scriptural example in which
monarchy was viewed as sinful, because it subordinated God's ultimate rule., 9
While helpful to rule out other forms, the new republic20 could not be
adequately defined through such comparisons.
As the new system defied easy labeling, the Framers sought common
understandings, consistently emphasizing the power of the people. Perhaps
most famously, in Federalist 39, Madison wrote:
[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a
government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the
great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their
offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is
essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the
society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it ....
It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be
appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people .... 21
The Framers believed that in the republic the people are supreme and self-
governing.
22
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. Wilson stated:
There are three simple species of government-monarchy, where the supreme
power is in a single person; aristocracy, where the supreme power is in a select
assembly, the members of which either fill up, by election, the vacancies in their
own body, or succeed to their places in it by inheritance, property, or in respect of
some personal right or qualification; a republic or democracy, where the people at
large retain the supreme power, and act either collectively or by representation.
Id. Charles Pinckney made the same point and offered the same subsequent arguments, in
strikingly similar language, in the South Carolina Convention. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra at
328 (Charles Pinckney). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican
Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 749, 758 (1994) ("In debates over the Constitution, republican government was
regularly contradistinguished from monarchy and aristocracy, but rarely from democracy.").
19. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in 2 THE LIFE AND WORKS OF
THOMAS PAINE 93, 110-14 (William M. Van der Weyde ed., Patriots' ed. 1925), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch4s4.html. Paine also looked at the
English system in search of an apt comparison. Id. at 102-07.
20. The operational specifics of the new national government were delineated in the rest
of the Constitution, particularly Articles 1, II, and 1Il. The republican form, however, is
capacious and can take various shapes.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
22. As Thomas Jefferson once observed, "we... consider the people as our children, and
love them with parental affection. But you love them as infants whom you are afraid to trust
without nurses; and I as adults whom I freely leave to self-government." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to P.-S. DuPont de Nemours (Apr. 24, 1816), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, POLITICAL
WRITINGS 290, 292 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999) [hereinafter JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS]. See also CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, THE AMERICAN FOUNDING EXPERIENCE, POLITICAL
COMMUNITY AND REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 146 (Charles E. Gilbert ed., 1994) ("Government
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Although the people are the source of power, they need not directly
participate in the administration of the republican government. 23 The Framers
understood that the Constitution was establishing a system that was to govern
the affairs of a large number of people across an expansive geographical area
with limited means of communication.24 A central government of elected
representatives could conveniently bring the divergent views of the thirteen
original states together for the developing national government.25 Accordingly,
the national government they designed was a republic that did the people's
business via representatives in the central government. Madison discussed this
characteristic in Federalist 14: "[I]n a democracy the people meet and exercise
the government in person; in a republic they assemble and administer it by their
representatives. '2 6 Jefferson concurred: "[A] government is republican in
proportion as every member composing it has his equal voice in the direction of
its concern (not indeed in person, which would be impracticable beyond the
limits of a city, or small township, but) by representatives chosen by
himself. ,,27
of the people, by the people, and for the people was cited above as the ground-level principle of
republican government in the mind of John Adams. Implied in that goal is a supposition that
the people will be worthy of self-government."). In addition, Madison wrote: "It is evident that
no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the
fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates
every votary of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-
government." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See also supra note 18 (discussing the Framers' view of a republic as the most suitable
governing structure).
23. In self-governing, problems arise, primarily in regard to questions of control, authority
and ability to function. Madison commented:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 1, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
24. See THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 100-02 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing the relative size of the Union). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (observing that one of the two great differences between
a democracy and a republic is "the greater number of citizens and greater sphere of country over
which the latter may be extended"). Also note that as the nation's population approaches 300
million, and states have many millions of residents themselves, these concerns are all the more
present.
25. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing the effect of "the delegation of the government ... to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest").
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 100 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
27. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in JEFFERSON,
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The national republic placed the trust of the people in the hands of a
federal government that would serve the people. The House was directly
elected; 28 while both the Senate and the President were indirectly elected (the
Senate by state legislatures 29 and the President by the Electoral College3"), the
mechanism was consistent with Madison's notion that it is sufficient that "the
persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the
people."' The Supreme Court was at the furthest remove, but still was
composed of jurists appointed by the President32 (who had been elected by
representatives chosen indirectly by the people through the Electoral College),
and consented to by the Senate33 (which had been elected by state legislatures
chosen by the people). The people could reign supreme without surrendering
their daily lives, and the government could function without the gridlock of
every citizen's individual participation. Although the people cede power to
their representatives, they retain the leverage of holding their representatives
accountable at the ballot box.34 These early voices demonstrate the central
WRITINGS, supra note 22, at 210, 211. Thus, the republic was an apt form of government, for
reasons of geography, or even practicality as well.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. I (providing for popular election of Representatives).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. I. Via constitutional amendment, Senators are now directly
chosen. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
30. U.S. CONST. art. Ii, § I; U.S. CONsT. amend. XII.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. Ii, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing the President's appointment power,
with Senate's "Advice and Consent").
33. Id.
34. Plus, a supermajority of the people (no small feat to assemble) has the power to amend
the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing for proposal of an amendment by two-
thirds of both Houses or State legislatures and ratification by three-fourths of the proposing
group); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("1 trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies in
questioning that fundamental principle of republican government which admits the right of the
people to alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with
their happiness ... ").
Speaking to this point, Alexander Hamilton believed that "[t]he people remained
'sovereign' only through the carefully guarded and complex machinery of election." GERALD
STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 53 (1970).
Madison added: "The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all
power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in
dependence on the people by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this
short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands." THE FEDERALIST
NO. 37, at 227 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 49,
at 313-14 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison argued:
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the
constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their
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importance of popular sovereignty3 5 and the Framers' desire to create a system
of government in which the power derived from, and remained in the hands of,
the people.36
A few court opinions have addressed this question,' 7 and they have echoed
the importance of the representative serving the best interests of the people. In
In re Duncan,38 for example, the Supreme Court observed that the republican
power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory to recur to the
same original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge,
diminish, or new-model the powers of government, but also whenever any one of
the departments may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the
others.
Id.
35. The North Carolina debates also provide an example of the emphasis placed on the
power of the government deriving from the people. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 18, at 9-
I1. See id. at I I (Iredell) (referring "to a government where the people are avowedly the
fountain of all power"); id. at 10 (MacLaine) ("The people here are the origin of all power.").
36. The Constitution's commitment to a republican form of government in the states is
also manifested in the provisions of Articles I and 11 regarding elections. Article I, Section 4
provides that "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof .... U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 4, cl. I. Article 11, Section I similarly states that "Each State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the Electors for presidential elections. U.S.
CONST. art. 11, § I, cl. 2.
A more recent perspective illustrates popular sovereignty's place at the heart of the
republican form of government, and therefore the Guarantee Clause. A Department of Justice
memorandum prepared for the Attorney General and President Franklin D. Roosevelt
considering the meaning of the Guarantee Clause observed that "[t]he distinguishing feature of a
republican form of government is the right of the people to choose their own officers for
governmental administration." Memorandum from Alexander Holtzoff, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., to the Attorney General 2 (Apr. 12, 1935) (on file with the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library). This memo was prepared "in relation to the present situation existing in
Louisiana," id. at 1, namely, President Roosevelt's conflict with Sen. Huey Long generally, and
specifically over Long's desire for full control over the spending of federal dollars in Louisiana.
"The President even wondered for a time whether the constitutional guarantee to states of a
republican form of government might not serve as a basis for action against Long. A
memorandum from Alexander Holtzoff of the Justice Department pointed to the ambiguities of
the constitutional provision and killed the idea." ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT, THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 250 (1960).
The recent disputes in both Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and the New Jersey Senate
election case, New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1035 (N.J. 2002), have
focused attention on the meaning of"Legislature" in these provisions. Although these provisions
were not the basis for resolving these matters, they raised strong arguments that the Framers
intended to limit the role of the state executive and judicial branches to ensure that the most
representative branch of state government controlled the selection of federal officials, whether
Electors or Senators.
37. The courts have only infrequently explored the meaning of the Guarantee Clause. For
further explication, see infra Part 1Il.A.
38. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449(1981).
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form of government is distinguished by "the right of the people to choose their
own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue
of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts
may be said to be those of the people themselves."39 The Court also recounted
some of the argument in Luther v. Borden,4° to the effect that "the people are
the source of all political power, but that as the exercise of governmental
powers immediately by the people themselves is impracticable, they must be
exercised by representatives of the people; that the basis of representation is
suffrage.",4' A more contemporary perspective from a New York court reflects
the same essential understanding: "The republican form of government
guaranteed by the Constitution 'contemplates representative government'
and... the distinguishing feature of a republican form of government is the
'right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental
administration ....
In the last ten years, the Guarantee Clause has received increased scholarly
attention43 and calls for its resurrection.44 But while scholars offer different
perspectives and pursue different agendas, popular sovereignty is consistently
believed to be at the core of the republican form of government. 4' The republic
serves the best interest of the people;46 by the design of the government itself,
39. Id. at 461.
40. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849). For a discussion of Luther, see infra
Part III.A.1.
41. Duncan, 139 U.S. at 461.
42. LaValle v. Hayden, 696 N.Y.S.2d 782, 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (challenging the
constitutionality of a New York law allowing the selection of University Regents by alternative
joint ballot in a unicameral legislature) (citations omitted).
43. William Wiecek spurred a renewed interest when he exhaustively examined the
Guarantee Clause in 1972, but there was little interest for two decades after that. WIECEK, supra
note 10. Most recently, the University of Colorado sponsored a symposium on the issue, which
generated a spate of articles printed in its law review. 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 708-946 (1994).
44. Erwin Chemerinsky urged: "[lit is time to resurrect the Guarantee Clause .... Once
awakened, the Guarantee Clause can provide the basis for the Court to address fundamental
questions about American government. What is a republican form of government?" Erwin
Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REv.
849, 879-80 (1994).
45. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New
Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 815, 816 (1994) [hereinafter Merritt,
Republican Governments] ("Most scholars would agree that a republican government is, at the
very least, one in which the people control their rulers.").
46. William Wiecek wrote that popular sovereignty was a reflection of the principle "that
government is founded on the consent of the governed and therefore should reflect the will of
the people. Frequently this phrase was merely a rhetorical flourish, but even when so used it
implied that the people are the source of all power." WIECEK, supra note 10, at 22-23. Further:
"What began simply as a revulsion, grounded in experience and necessity, against rule by kings
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the people rule.47 To understand how the people truly remain sovereign, we
next must consider the people's voice: the representative.
A republic in the form of a central government-such as the one we see in
Washington, D.C.-depends upon the representative to act in the best interest
of the people and the nation. Although a republic is "a government in which
the scheme of representation takes place,, 48 that does not mean that the
representative will vote the specific will of each constituent in every vote-that
is impossible. But it does mean that large numbers of people are to be
represented by an individual who will exercise his or her best judgment on their
behalf in the daily process of governance. 49 The representative owes his or her
best judgment, on behalf of the community.5s
became transformed into a pledge of popular government." Id. at 62.
47. Akhil Amar has argued forcefully about the importance of popular sovereignty in the
American system. "The central pillar of Republican Government, I claim, is popular
sovereignty. In a Republican Government, the people rule .... What it does require is that the
structure of day-to-day government-the Constitution-be derived from 'the People .... "
Amar, supra note 18, at 749. Christian Fritz has offered a thorough exploration of popular
sovereignty as both "the dynamic concept that underlay[s] the American Revolution" and "the
central challenge to Americans in establishing republican governments." Christian G. Fritz,
Alternate Visions ofAmerican Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American
Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 288-89 (1997). He also wrote that
"Americans were both united in accepting popular sovereignty as the foundational principle of
their governments and divided over how to implement the principle." Id. at 289. James
Gardner has argued that our Constitution is based on a Lockean concept of popular sovereignty,
in which individuals band together for mutual security and advantage, surrendering the natural
right to self-rule to the collective. The government is an agent of the people, exercising powers
delegated to it by them. James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing
Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 189, 201-03 (1990).
In addition, one group has explained:
"We the People ... do ordain and establish this Constitution." These words are
contained in the Constitution's Preamble and give expression to the doctrine of
popular sovereignty, or rule by the people. The Constitution's Framers crafted a
governing document, which they submitted for popular ratification, based on the
conception that ultimate political authority resides not in the government or in any
single government official, but rather, in the people. "We, the People" own our
government, but under our representative democracy, we delegate the day-to-day
governing powers to a body of elected representatives. However, this delegation of
powers in no way impairs or diminishes the people's rights and responsibilities as
the supreme sovereign. The government's legitimacy remains dependent on the
governed, who retain the inalienable right to alter or abolish their government or
amend their Constitution.
NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, at http://www.constitution
center.org/explore/OriginsoftheConstitution/ConstitutionBasics/PopularSovereignty. html (last
visited June 21, 2003).
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
49. Adams observed that the "Representative Assembly... should be in miniature, an
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The development of this aspect of the republic is instructive. In early
English representative governments, elected representatives were chosen to
represent the people of an area, not any particular special interest. " Toward
that end, the Framers hoped their new system of government would attract
individuals of the utmost noble spirit, moved by the good of the country. 52
"The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community
should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of
their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every
sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse... .,,5 The experiment
in the United States of America thus was designed to effect more than local
elected representation, 4 but also to ensure that representatives consider the
exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them." JOHN
ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (Apr. 1776), reprinted in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 86, 87
(Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1979), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/v I ch4s5.html.
50. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison wrote: "In the extended Republic of
the United States, The General Government would hold a pretty even balance between the
parties of particular States, and be at the same time sufficiently restrained by its dependence on
the community, from betraying its general interests." Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 206, 214 (Robert A. Rutland et
al. eds., 1977), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v I ch I7s22.
html. At times, the representative will have to exercise bestjudgment as to a specific issue that
has a direct impact on the local community; other times, the representative will vote on the good
of the nation-state.
51. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE, THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 41 (1988) ("[I]n England and America... the community was
geographically defined. It was the Isle of Kent or the borough of St. Mary's; it was Shropshire
or Staffordshire, Norwich or Bristol; it was never the worshipful company of grocers or
cordwainers, never the tobacco farmers' union or the association of shipowners."). Morgan
further described the landed gentry who served early English Parliament: "Whatever their
powers might be, at home or abroad, they sat at Westminster as representatives, not of their
class, but of localities." Id. at 42.
52. Charles Pinckney also argued that it is important for representatives in the national
government to put the common good ahead of provincial concerns. See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 18, at 331-32 (discussing the relative strength of the nation as a whole versus the
weaknesses of individual states).
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
The Framers also knew that human nature being as it is, some would act out of self-interest, but
such ambition would be held in check by the operation of factions in government. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80-81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (considering the
causes and effects of factions).
54. In the American political system, power was exercised by "representatives chosen by
[the people] either mediately or immediately and legally accountable to them." Alexander
Hamilton's Notes for his speech of July 12, 1888 at the New York Ratifying Convention, in 5
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 149, 150 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds.,
1962). See also STOURZH, supra note 34, at 49 ("Though the term 'representative democracy' is
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
broader interests of the collective nation." For example, Edmund Burke wrote:
"Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment .... 6
James Wilson opined: "Permit me to proceed to what I deem another
excellency of this system: All authority, of every kind, is derived by
REPRESENTATIONfrom the PEOPLE, and the DEMOCRATIC principle is carried
into every part of the government."5 7 Representatives were considered central
in the form of government that would carry out the will of the people.
In various contexts, the Court has spoken to the importance of
representation. Reynolds v. Sims58 provides a particularly well-known example:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by
voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a
representative form of government, and our legislatures are those
instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of
the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a
bedrock of our political system.
59
Some of the modem redistricting cases echo the importance of community
representation. For example, in Shaw v. Reno, ° the Court confronted the issue
commonplace in our day, it was novel then, and Hamilton, who as early as 1777 had referred to
the government of New York State as a representative democracy, was among the first, if not the
first, to use it."). Hamilton also had a simpler conception based on separation of powers. "This
plan was in my conception conformable with the strict theory of a Government purely
republican; the essential criteria of which are that the principal organs of the Executive and
Legislative departments be elected by the people and hold their offices by a responsible and
temporary or defeasible tenure." 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 17, at 398.
55. To help achieve these goals, and to prevent against aristocratic tendencies, the
representatives would be chosen from the many, not the few. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). As Madison wrote:
[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a
government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body
of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure
for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government
that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
proportion or a favored class of it ....
Id.
56. 2 EDMUND BURKE, WoRKs 95 (Cambridge, University Press: Welch, Bigelow, & Co.
1866). Thomas Paine discussed the need to "leave the legislative part to be managed by a select
number chosen from the whole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stake
which those have who appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body
would act were they present." PAINE, supra note 19, at 97.
57. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 18, at 482 (James Wilson).
58. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
59. Id. at 562.
60. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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of race-conscious redistricting and "majority-minority" congressional districts.
In so doing, the Court worried that with race-based districting, "elected officials
are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the
members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is
altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. 6 1 Similarly,
some of the recent federalism cases reflect the principle that the elected
representative serves the people and owes them his or her best judgment in
61service. 2 In these various ways the importance of representatives is stressed in
the case law.
In sum, elected representatives in a republic serve the people by exercising
their best judgment on behalf of the people of their community, not the special
interests of the few or self-interest.63 The representative is an agent of the
61. Id. at 648. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Bush v. Vera reiterated this theme,
expressing the need for community members to have equal power and not to be limited in their
political participation. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor wrote of her concern with situations in which "the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of [e.g., a racial minority group] in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
62. In Printz v. United States, for example, the Court rejected a federal gun control statute
because of a concern that the state chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) would be held
accountable for the impact of a federal enactment. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920
(1997) ("The Constitution thus contemplates that a State's government will represent and
remain accountable to its own citizens."). At the same time, the elected representative who
made the initial policy decision would be insulated from being directly responsive to the
community he or she represents. The Court worried that, funding issues aside, with such laws
the states would still be "put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for
its defects. Under the present law, for example, it will be the CLEO and not some federal
official who stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun." Id. at 930
(citation omitted). The Court declared that the federal government may not commandeer the
state government; such interference with the relationship between the people and the states
would prevent the state government from being responsive to its citizens. Id. at 932-33.
Further, according to Deborah Jones Merritt: "If Congress tells state legislatures to enact a
particular law, and the states must comply, then the state legislatures become slaves of an
outside power rather than servants of their electorate." Merritt, Republican Governments, supra
note 45, at 816. While disagreeing with her perspective that the states need greater protection
from the federal government and that the Guarantee Clause only serves that limited role, this
Article shares Professor Merritt's concern that representatives must be responsive servants of
the people.
63. Madison also addressed this problem and factions in FEDERALIST 10: "If a faction
consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the
majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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people, acting in their best interest, but not as a mindless puppet.64 Through the
debate among representatives offering their best judgment and the consequent
resolution of problems,65 the central government serves the people.
This Part has shown that popular sovereignty lies at the heart of the
American republic and the Guarantee Clause, and that the republic is
predicated on the responsibilities of the representative to the people of the
community and the nation as a whole. But, as we will see in Part IV, elected
representatives today are often beholden to campaign cash, placing the special
interest of the few ahead of the best interests of the many.66 In that context, we
will see that campaign finance reform thus can ensure the vitality of the
64. In discussing this idea, William Wiecek wrote:
Popular sovereignty ... led to the "agency" concept of government: the people are
the principles, their elected representatives the agents chosen to carry out the
popular will .... This did not mean that representatives were to be merely
mouthpieces for whatever a numerical majority believed at any one time, but rather
that, in the long run, the elected officials, exercising their independent judgment,
would reflect what most enfranchised citizens wanted most of the time.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 23.
65. Republican revival and deliberative democracy theorists also have emphasized the
importance of the collective debate by representatives. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988) ("The republican commitment to
universalism amounts to a belief in the possibility of mediating different approaches to politics,
or different conceptions of the public good, through discussion and dialogue."); Frank I.
Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of
Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 293 (1989) ("Deliberative politics connotes an
argumentative interchange among persons who recognize each other as equal in authority and
entitlement to respect,jointly directed by them towards arriving at a reasonable answer to some
question of public ordering .... ). Still others focus on the importance of this debate. See Paul
W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins ofAmerican Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449,461
(1989) ("Constitutional republican politics is, then, a paradigmatic case of the link between
psychological and political order: It is a political form in which deliberation can become the
basis for effective political choice."); Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 CoLuM. L. REV.
2470, 2479 (1997) ("Democracy not only vests the choice of government officials in the
citizens, it also presupposes that the citizens' choices will be informed. Only then are the
people engaged in legitimate self-governance."). In the specific context of the Guarantee
Clause, Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde has suggested that representative
government and debate are at the heart of the republic: "The Guarantee Clause did not forbid
state laws based on interest or passion or prejudice. It demands deliberation by responsible
representatives to contain these motives and to cool what the Supreme Court, explaining the
guarantee of republican government in 1891, called 'the impulses of mere majorities."' Hans A.
Linde, Who Is Responsiblefor Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 709,725 (1994)
-(citing In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891)). See generally Hans A. Linde, On
Reconstituting "Republican Government", 19 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REv. 193 (1994) (arguing that
state judges have a larger role to play in this debate and that initiatives and referenda threaten
republican governance).
66. Part IV.B. 1-2, infra, focuses particularly on this point.
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republican form of government. Before making that connection, Part III
discusses how the Clause has been enforced and interpreted, examination of
which will reveal deference in the courts and a strong role for Congress.
I11 Guarantee Clause Interpretation and Enforcement
The courts have left Guarantee Clause enforcement to Congress by
holding such cases to be nonjusticiable political questions, better left to the
experience and capabilities of Congress. This Part proceeds first by examining
the Guarantee Clause in court; next by reviewing congressional action; and
finally by concluding that Congress bears the responsibility to enforce the
Guarantee. We will then more clearly understand that Congress must assist the
states in protecting the republican form of government, a task that can be
accomplished through campaign finance reform.
A. The Guarantee Clause-A Closed Door
This exploration of Guarantee Clause interpretation and enforcement
begins in the courts, where analysis is sparse and mostly limited to declaring
Guarantee Clause matters to be nonjusticiable. In Luther v. Borden, decided in
1849, the Supreme Court declared that Guarantee Clause enforcement belonged
not to the Court, but to the Congress; for the courts, these matters posed
nonjusticiable political questions.67 The review that follows details a long
period during which courts avoided deciding Guarantee Clause matters, as well
as a recent renewed interest in the Court on the Clause. 6' At the end of this
Section, we will see that, 150-plus years after Luther, it remains true that
Guarantee Clause questions are still not within the courts' competence;
Congress must enforce the mandate.
1. First Analysis-Luther v. Borden
In 1849 the Supreme Court stated in Luther v. Borden that cases arising
under the Guarantee Clause are not justiciable, primarily because they raise
political questions that properly belong to the coordinate branches for
67. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (stating that a Congressional
decision on a Guarantee Clause issue "could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal").
68. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,183-86 (1992) (discussing recent shifts
in consideration of the Guarantee Clause).
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resolution. 69 The Luther Court was asked to resolve a controversy stemming
from Dorr's Rebellion, which involved a challenge to the legitimacy of the
Rhode Island charter government as it then existed. 70 The Court declined to
answer the central question in the case: Which government was the legitimate
government of Rhode Island? The Court viewed the case as proper for
resolution by the political branches, but a nonjusticiable political question in
court.7 The Court held:
Under [the Guarantee Clause] of the Constitution it rests with Congress to
decide what government is established in a State. For as the United States
guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must
necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can
determine whether it is republican or not .... And its decision is binding
on every other department of the government, and could not be questioned
in a judicial tribunal.
72
Therefore, only Congress and the President could resolve which
government was legitimate; resolution of the issue belonged to the
69. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42 ("It rested with Congress,... to determine upon
the means proper to be adopted to fulfill this guarantee.").
70. For a very helpful account of the litigation in Luther, see WIECEK, supra note 10, at
113-29. The facts of Luther are, briefly, as follows. Unlike the rest of the states at the time of
the American Revolution, Rhode Island did not draft a new constitution; instead it continued the
government established by its original royal charter (with modifications to attain statehood),
granted by the King of England in 1663. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 3-4. In 184 1, however, a
convention assembled to redress malapportionment issues, and to frame a state constitution that
was proposed and ratified against the existing government's wishes. Id. at 4-7.
In order to maintain its power and resist the new constitution, the existing (charter)
government enacted a law, making it illegal to vote in elections held to establish and organize
the constitutional government. Id. at 6. In violation of the law, however, elections were held, a
new government formed, and Thomas Dorr was "elected" governor. See id. at 25 (reporting that
Governor Don" was tried for treason). The charter government subsequently declared martial
law to prevent it from being overthrown by armed "insurrectionists," including Martin Luther, a
citizen of Massachusetts who supported Don" and his new government. Id. at 8-9.
Luther M. Borden and other members of the Rhode Island militia were ordered to arrest
Martin Luther for aiding and partaking in the rebellion. Id. at 10. After being denied
admission, Borden broke into and entered Luther's home. Id. When Luther sued for trespass
(in the U.S. Circuit Court for Rhode Island), Borden contended that the trespass was a
legitimate exercise of his power under martial law, granted by the charter government. Id. at 9-
10 (setting forth the defendants' arguments). Luther, however, argued that at the time the
trespass was committed, the newly ratified constitution was the supreme law of Rhode Island,
and the charter government was unconstitutional. Id. at 18.
71. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42 ("[T]he Constitution of the United States, as far as it
has provided for an emergency of this kind, and authorized the general government to interfere
in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated the subject as political in nature, and placed the
power in the hands of that department.").
72. Id.
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decisionmaking of the coordinate political branches, and it was nonjusticiable.
Luther v. Borden thus is well known for its negative holding: Courts cannot
enforce the Guarantee Clause because it raises nonjusticiable issues.73 The
positive corollary of Luther v. Borden may be more important: The Guarantee
Clause is nonjusticiable because the power to enforce its command rests with
the political branches, particularly the Congress.74
2. Long Time, Little Change
The Court's opinion in Luther shut the door on judicial resolution of
matters involving the Guarantee Clause. Subsequent efforts typically have
been turned back by simultaneously denying judicial power with respect to the
Clause and asserting Congress's authority to act pursuant to Guarantee Clause
authority. One wave came in several post-Civil War cases, in which southern
states challenged their status as states, particularly in the context of the
Reconstruction Acts.7" The first invocation of the Guarantee Clause after
Luther was in the aftermath of the Civil War in Texas v. White.76 The state of
Texas was the plaintiff, and the issue was the proper ownership of certain U.S.
government-issued bonds." The threshold question was whether the plaintiff
was, in the eyes of the law, the state of Texas.7" While the Court had original
jurisdiction of suits by states,79 the rebellion had thrown into doubt who, or
what, could properly be considered the state in those states that had attempted
to secede.80 The Court had no difficulty in deciding that the acts of secession
were invalid: A state had no right, under the Constitution, to secede from the
union,"1 and therefore all acts of secession were invalid, and Texas had
remained a state within the United States.8 2 But although the state of Texas did
73. For a further discussion of this proposition, see infra Part III.A.
74. For an affirmative discussion of Congress's powers, see infra Part III.B.
75. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428; Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; Act
of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14 (collectively, "Reconstruction Acts").
76. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
77. Id. at 702-03.
78. Id. at 718-19.
79. Id. at 702; U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 2.
80. See Texas, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 724 (asking, "Did Texas... cease to be a State?").
81. See id. at 726 (declaring acts of secession invalid).
82. Id. at 726. The Court wrote:
Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of
secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of
Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance,
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not secede, 3 the government of Texas essentially ceased to function. 4 After
the War, a new government had to be established:
There being then no government in Texas in constitutional relations with
the Union, it became the duty of the United States to provide for the
restoration of such a government. But the restoration of the government
which existed before the rebellion, without a new election of officers, was
obviously impossible; and before any such election could be properly held,
it was necessary that the old constitution should receive such amendments
as would conform its provisions to the new conditions created by
emancipation, and afford adequate security to the people of the State. 85
This new government, first established by the President, was
"provisional,, 8 6 thereby giving Congress the opportunity to confirm the
legitimacy of the new government in the exercise of its power under the
Guarantee Clause.87 Citing Luther, the Court observed that "the power to carry
into effect the clause of guaranty is primarily a legislative power, and resides in
were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations
of the State, as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen
of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows that the
State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union.
Id.
83. Id. The Court had previously considered the meaning of "state":
In the Constitution the term state most frequently expresses the combined idea just
noticed, of people, territory, and government. A state, in the ordinary sense of the
Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of
defined boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a
written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed .... But [the
word "state"] is also used in its geographical sense, as in the clauses which require
that a representative in Congress shall be an inhabitant of the State in which he
shall be chosen, and that the trial of crimes shall be held within the State where
committed.
And there are instances in which the principal sense of the word seems to be that
primary one to which we have adverted, of a people or political community, as
distinguished from a government.
In this latter sense the word seems to be used in the clause which provides that the
United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of
government, and shall protect each of them against invasion.
Id. at 721. In this clause a plain distinction is made between a state and the government of a
state.
84. The Court found the Confederate government to be illegitimate. See id. at 726-27
(discussing the consequences of attempted secession).
85, Id. at 729.
86, Id. at 729-3 1.
87. See id. (discussing the Guarantee Clause and Congress's role after the Civil War).
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Congress."88 The Court thus affirmed two key points: (1) that Guarantee
Clause issues are nonjusticiable political questions; and (2) that Congress has a
right to act under the Guarantee Clause. 9
Another set of instructive judicial decisions involved initiatives and
referenda.90 In 1912, the Court reiterated its position that Guarantee Clause
interpretation was a nonjusticiable political question in Pacific States
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.9' In this case, a corporation challenged
88. Id. at 730 (citing Luther). The Court also observed:
In the exercise of the power conferred by the guaranty clause, as in the exercise of
every other constitutional power, a discretion in the choice of means is necessarily
allowed. It is essential only that the means must be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the power conferred, through the restoration of the State to
its constitutional relations, under a republican form of government, and that no acts
be done, and no authority exerted, which is either prohibited or unsanctioned by the
Constitution.
Id. at 729. Note how this language echoes the Necessary and Proper clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18, as well as the Court's broad language in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 421 (1819).
The quotation in this sentence is from Luther v. Borden, but Texas v. White could not be
farther removed. In the former case, the reference to legislative power was to justify the Court's
refusal to decide the issue, Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42, but in Texas v. White, the sentence
validated Congress's action in passing the laws that confirmed the President's provisional
establishment of a new government in Texas. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 700, 729
(1868). The Court stated that the case did not require it to "pronounce judgment upon the
constitutionality of any particular provision of [the Restoration Acts]." Id. at 731.
Nevertheless, in holding that it did have original jurisdiction over the case before it, the Court
necessarily validated the Reconstruction Acts in their establishment or recognition of a new
government of Texas. This new government, and those in other secessionist states, "which had
been established and had been in actual operation under executive direction, were recognized by
Congress as provisional, as existing, and as capable of continuance." Id.
89. See also Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867) (finding the
determination of the legitimate state government of Georgia to be a political question for
Congress or the President to determine, not the courts, and that such matters of political rights
are nonjusticiable); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500-01 (1866) (holding the
President's implementation of a congressional enactment, the Reconstruction Acts, to be a
nonjusticiable political question).
90. For an illuminating discussion of this specific area, see Amar, supra note 18, at 756-
59 (arguing that the Guarantee Clause does not prohibit direct democracy). There may be an
interest in challenging direct democracy in light of gay rights and other laws that are viewed as
not being progressive. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative,
Referendum, and the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REv. 807, 809 (2002)
(reporting both a conservative and a liberal distaste for "citizen lawmaking"); Hans A. Linde,
When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government". The Campaign Against
Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 19 (1993) (discussing an Oregon antihomosexuality
initiative).
9 1. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
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an Oregon corporate tax that had been adopted by the initiative process,
92
arguing that the manner of adoption contravened the Guarantee Clause. 93 The
corporation argued that such initiatives and referenda would destroy republican
government in the state.94 In holding the case nonjusticiable, 95 the Court
observed that the legislative branch should decide the political question of
whether a state government is republican, but the judicial branch should
interpret the Constitution, in the context of specific governmental actions.96
This attack on the state, qua state (not qua actor), was a nonjusticiable
Guarantee Clause issue, properly reserved to the Congress, the political
branch.97 The following year, in Marshall v. Dye,9 the Court again made clear
its path in these cases, in declining to rule on the Guarantee Clause aspects of a
challenge to a referendum to change the Indiana State Constitution.99 The
Court held that the Guarantee Clause enforcement power was "conferred upon
the Congress of the United States."'' ° As courts followed the Luther lead for
92. Id. at 135.
93. Id. at 137.
94. The corporation proceeded "upon the theory that the adoption of the initiative and
referendum destroyed all government republican in form in Oregon." Id. at 141.
95. The Court first considered justiciability, before addressing the substantive meaning of
the Clause itself. According to the Court, "the case [came] to the single issue whether the
enforcement of that provision, because of its political character, is exclusively committed to
Congress or is judicial in its character." Id. at 137. Note also that the Court refers to
"exclusive" congressional enforcement powers. Id.
96. See id. at 150 ("[T]he legislative duty [is] to determine the political questions
involved in deciding whether a state government republican in form exists, and the judicial
power ... in a controversy properly submitted [is] to enforce and uphold the applicable
provisions of the Constitution as to each and every exercise of governmental power.").
97. Id. at 150-5 1. The court proceeded to note:
It is the government, the political entity, which ... is called to the bar of this court,
not for the purpose of testing judicially some exercise of power assailed, on the
ground that its exertion has injuriously affected the rights of an individual because
of repugnancy to some constitutional limitation, but to demand of the State that it
establish its right to exist as a State, republican in form.
Id.
98. Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913).
99. See id. at 255-57 (setting forth the background of the case and finding no justiciable
controversy).
100. Id. at 256. The court found:
[Pacific States] held that [the Guarantee Clause] depended for enforcement upon
political and governmental action through powers conferred upon the Congress of
the United States. The full treatment of the subject in that case renders further
consideration of that question unnecessary, and the contention in this behalf
presents no justiciable controversy ....
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decades,' 0' the Guarantee Clause door was not open in court. °2 Instead, the
mandate is to be implemented by Congress.
3. Slight Opening
Toward the end of the 20th century, after almost 150 years, the United
States Supreme Court opened the door slightly-and only slightly-in New
York v. United States. 0 3 In this case, the Court held that the Tenth Amendment
prohibited the Congress from commandeering state governments, thus striking
a federal regulation that required states to "take title" to radioactive waste. 
104
Writing for the majority, 105 Justice O'Connor also briefly addressed the
101. For example, in 1930, the U.S. Supreme Court held: "As to the guaranty to every
State of a republican form of government (Sec. 4, Art. IV), it is well settled that the questions
arising under it are political, not judicial, in character and thus are for the consideration of the
Congress and not the courts." Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74,79-
80 (1930); see also Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (noting "the
settled rule that the question of whether that guarantee of the Constitution has been disregarded
presents no justiciable controversy").
102. See also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) ("Violation of the great
guaranty of a republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the courts.").
One author has reported:
These attempted applications of the clause were regularly rejected by the state
courts, usually on the grounds that the challenged innovation did not so far blur the
lines between the departments of government as to negate the republican character
of the state. Thus in the two generations between 1871 and 1937 state courts
permitted legislatures [a wide array of activities].
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 256-57. While for the most part, the Court said almost nothing of
substance during this period, two cases offered minimal insights, as they did not defer the
Guarantee Clause issue. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-76, 178 (1874)
(observing that "[n]o particular government is designated as republican, neither is the exact form
to be guaranteed, in any manner especially designated," but finding that Missouri did not violate
the Guarantee Clause in denying women suffrage); In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891)
("[T]he distinguishing feature of that [republican] form is the right of the people to choose their
own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the
legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those
of the people themselves . ").
103. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
104. See id. at 177 (finding that "the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of
our Government established by the Constitution").
105. The Court held that such actions would undermine the state governments'
accountability to the people, as the federal government could otherwise make decisions, but the
state governments would be held accountable for those same decisions. Id. at 168-69. This
challenge by the State of New York to a federal provision regulating the handling of low level
radioactive waste is generally seen as an important declaration of Tenth Amendment limitations
on the federal government, in line with the current Court's growing protection of states' rights.
See, e.g., Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,756-60 (2002)
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applicability of the Guarantee Clause.106 She observed its rare application in
court and confirmed that such issues are typically viewed as nonjusticiable
political questions.' °7 Even though she cracked the door for the future,'0 8
Justice O'Connor closed the door for Guarantee Clause application in that
particular case.'°9
(applying the bar of state sovereign immunity to halt a federal administrative proceeding);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) (finding that Congress exceeded its
Commerce Clause authority when it created a federal remedy for intrastate violence against
women); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress may not
require state officials to "administer or enforce a federal regulatory program"); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (finding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority because it impinged on local matters). See
generally Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfora
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. I (1988) [hereinafter Merritt, State Autonomy].
106. The issue of Guarantee Clause applicability had been raised in some briefs: amicus
curiae State of Michigan contended that it was "appropriate to rely upon the protections
afforded by the Guarantee Clause as a restraint on Congress in the exercise of its delegated
authority under the Commerce Clause." BriefofArmicus Curiae State of Michigan in Support of
Petitioners at 4, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Nos. 91-543, 91-558, 91-
563). Further, the brief argued that when a "statute in question significantly shifts the balance
of power from the States to Congress," the conclusion should be that "it infringes upon the
rights guaranteed to States under the Guarantee Clause." Id. at 13. Another brief argued:
In a republican government, all power derives from the voters. The citizens of a
republican state decide when to exercise their legislative or executive power and
how to wield that authority. If the federal government forces the states to adopt a
statute, it destroys this relationship between state voters and their representatives;
state legislators become accountable to Congress, rather than to their constituents.
Similarly, if the national government compels the states to enforce federal
regulatory programs, state budgets and executive resources reflect federal priorities
rather than the wishes of local citizens. These results are antithetical to the popular
control exerted in a republican form of government.
Brief for Petitioner the County of Allegheny at 13, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (Nos. 91-543, 91-558, 91-563) (citing Merritt, State Autonomy, supra note 105, at 61-
62).
107. See New York, 505 U.S. at 184 (addressing the Guarantee Clause). Justice O'Connor
wrote:
We approach the issue with some trepidation, because the Guarantee Clause has
been an infrequent basis for litigation throughout our history. In most of the cases
in which the Court has been asked to apply the Clause, the Court has found the
claims presented to be nonjusticiable under the 'political question' doctrine.
Id.
108. On a related note, Justice O'Connor had mused about the subject in her dissent in
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 531 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), suggesting that it
was arguable the Guarantee Clause may protect a "[s]tate's autonomy ... from substantial
federal incursions," citing Merritt, State Autonomy, supra note 105, at 70-78.
109. New York, 505 U.S. at 186 ("Thus even indulging the assumption that the Guarantee
Clause provides a basis upon which a State or its subdivisions may sue to enjoin the
enforcement of a federal statute, petitioners have not made out such a claim in these cases.").
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Several other prominent cases involving state-federal relations also raised
the issue of Guarantee Clause applicability around the same time as New York
v. United States. 10 In several cases, amici argued that the Guarantee Clause
serves as a restraint on the federal government, notwithstanding the language of
the Clause, which affirmatively commands the federal government to act to
protect the republican form of government in each state."' As this argument
ignores the Guarantee Clause's affirmative command, it has not succeeded." 2
110. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), the Court considered
whether a state could deny ballot access to multiterm Congressional incumbents. In an amicus
brief, several states argued that the "right of States to control selection of their representatives
goes to the heart of the Guarantee Clause." Brief of the States of Nebraska et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 26, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779
(1995) (Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828). In justifying this assertion, the amici noted that in In re
Duncan, the Court stated that a republican form of government granted the people the right to
"choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws .... "
Brief of the States of Nebraska et al. at 27 (quoting In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891)).
Therefore, the amici contended, the guarantee of a republican form of government implicitly
promises to the states the autonomy to respond to the will of the people. Brief of the States of
Nebraska et al. at 29 (quoting Merritt, State Autonomy, supra note 105, at 25). Unless the form
chosen was not republican, amici argued, the United States had no constitutional mandate or
ability to intervene with the state's choice. Brief of the States of Nebraska et al. at 26-29.
Further, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), one amicus brief argued that the
"Guarantee Clause 'implies a modest restraint on federal power to interfere with state
autonomy,"' because states must be allowed to "establish and maintain their own forms of
government." Brief of Rita Gluzman as Arnica Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10-1I,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) (quoting Merritt, State
Autonomy, supra note 105, at 2). This brief also cited Laurence Tribe's work in which he stated
that the text of the Guarantee Clause "provides a compelling justification for the Court to use
Article IV as a basis for marking the outer limits and inviolate spheres of state autonomy." Id. at
II (quoting 2 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMEICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 910 (3d ed. 2000)).
I11. A further irony is that the Guarantee Clause grants apparent authority, or even a
mandate, for the federal legislature to provide a mechanism to foster the ideal of the republican
form of government in the states. But the same clause provides no parallel command for the
federal government, a republic, to protect itself as it protects the states. The Clause thus
requires the federal government to act to protect the states, but is silent about protecting itself.
Further, the Constitution specifically charges the states with the responsibility of prescribing the
"Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives." U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. For an example of where the states unsuccessfully attempted to exercise
this power to limit the number of terms a federal elected officeholder could serve, see US. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
112. The states' rights approach to these cases builds upon the work of Deborah Jones
Merritt, who has argued that the Guarantee Clause protects state sovereignty. See, e.g., Merritt,
Republican Governments, supra note 45, at 816 ("In a federal system, however, some exercises
of national power also shatter the republican bond between state voters and their state
representatives."); see generally Merritt, State Autonomy, supra note 105. The argument
continues that the Guarantee Clause should not necessarily be seen as a sword of federal
affirmative power, but instead as a shield to protect the states:
The text of the Guarantee Clause can be read, not only as a grant of congressional
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While there has been no new resolution on justiciability"3 or Congress's
ultimate enforcement responsibility since 1992,'4 there has been a renewed
interest in judicial review of Guarantee Clause matters." 5 In sum, the courts
power, but as a limit on that power. The national government may intervene to
restore republican government in states that have deviated from that principle, but it
also promises in the Guarantee Clause to avoid any actions that would destroy
republican government.
Merritt, Republican Governments, supra note 45, at 820. This argument also has roots in
southerners in the pre-Civil War era, in the debate over the Guarantee Clause and slavery. See
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 146 ("The southerners [in 1820] argued that the clause was not an
innovative device, but rather a limitation on federal power."). Furthermore, "[t]his insistence on
republicanism as self-government for the states, free of federal interference, characterized the
position of the South through the end of Reconstruction." Id. at 147. Again, Merritt's position
is ironic in its insistence that the affirmative mandate in the Guarantee Clause that the federal
government assist the states be instead interpreted as a bar on federal government intrusion into
the sphere of states' rights. Although influential with some, its fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of the Guarantee Clause limits the power of the argument. For an insightful
critique of Merritt's position, see Kathryn Abrams, No "There" There: State Autonomy and
Voting Rights Regulation, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 835 (1994).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 83 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he Court has
yet to identify any such [justiciable] claims."); Schultz v. Pataki, 960 F. Supp. 568, 575
(N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[Tjhis Court is left with scant guidance in determining when the general rule
of nonjusticiability should be abrogated.").
114. This basic argument has not succeeded elsewhere. See Kelley v. United States, 69
F.3d 1503, 1510-11 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting as without merit a state claim that the Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 violated the Guarantee Clause by infringing
upon states' rights).
115. Justice O'Connor's long-term vision of the Court and legal doctrine may give reason
to believe that the Guarantee Clause has prospects for future adjudication. Two authors have
offered a marketplace analogy to the development of legal doctrine in this context:
Whether ultimately successful or not,. . .O'Connor has engaged in a very clever
entrepreneurial strategy, one that combines deference to the long tradition of the
market and the intrepid, even unexpected introduction of the new product [the
Guarantee Clause perspective]. Using the conventional Tenth Amendment and
fiscal burden arguments, she very quickly established herself as one of the Court's
federalism experts .... Thus, she built important credentials in the congested
intergovernmental market.
Her certification well established, she was then in a position to inaugurate the novel
idea in her South Carolina v. Baker dissent .... Since then, she has moved quite
cautiously, but deliberately, apparently attempting to build slow consensus for the
Guarantee Clause product which she hopes will at least join the Tenth Amendment
on the market shelves.
WAYNE V. MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES, JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDGE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 98 (1997). Perhaps like the "undue burden" standard she
introduced in City ofAkron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and which the Court adopted in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992), Justice O'Connor's Guarantee Clause perspective will gain
enough adherents so that the Guarantee Clause will become the basis for resolution of a
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have rarely given much content to the Guarantee Clause; instead they find such
matters to be nonjusticiable.' 16 The Court's approach to the Guarantee Clause
provides Congress with the ability to define the term republican and enforce the
mandate on its terms. 
17
B. Congressional Power, Expertise and Ability
Beyond the judicial deference we have just examined, Congress has
particular expertise and ability, as will be seen in this subpart, to enforce the
different case in the future. While some may be persuaded, it bears emphasis that this Article
suggests a vision completely different from Justice O'Connor's. This Article suggests a more
proactive role for the federal government pursuant to the Guarantee Clause, while she has
suggested a restraint on the federal government.
116. Of the few recent cases to come to the lower federal courts, the vast majority have not
joined the issue. A typical example is Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996), a
case challenging federal immigration policy and its impact on the states. While noting the
opening from New York v. United States, the court held that "there is no basis for us to say that
the plaintiffs here have presented a justiciable claim. Furthermore, nothing in their complaint
indicates in any way that federal immigration policies are depriving New York State of a
republican form of government." Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1996). See
also California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997) (reaching the same result
regarding justiciability); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1996)
(same); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094, 1097 (11 th Cir. 1995) (same). A few cases also
come to the state courts. See, e.g., Lowe v. Keisling, 882 P.2d 91, 100-01 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)
("[T]he United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Guaranty Clause as presenting a
purely political question that is exclusively for Congress and not the courts to decide, precludes
the courts of this state from entering any declaration about compliance with the Guaranty
Clause."). Other challenges typically have been swept aside with a few strokes of the pen, as the
courts recognize the role of Congress in Guarantee Clause enforcement. A typical example of
the courts' hands-off approach comes in a cursory analysis that disposes of both the
justiciability argument and the applicability argument in a few brief sentences. The "analysis"
reads, in full:
Likewise, the Court does not find that the Guarantee Clause bars this action. The
Supreme Court has questioned whether the Guarantee Clause was meant to be used
as a source for litigation. Regardless, the Court finds that the Act does not violate
the Guarantee Clause; the Act does not "deny [the] State a republican form of
government."
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 766,772 (E.D. Ky. 1998)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (rejecting a challenge to federal regulation of the
telephone industry). The modem courts have left the enforcement of the Clause to Congress.
117. In the context of the Reconstruction-era cases, Wiecek has written:
The net immediate effect of these cases was to leave the clause what it had been
since Luther v. Borden, an open-ended authorization to Congress to work out its
own conception of what was required in a republican form of government and to
implement this conception as it saw fit.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 211.
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Guarantee Clause mandate. The text of the Constitution itself and the history
of its enforcement affirm this position.
The Framers did not provide an unambiguous definition of the term
republican form of government." 18 By not doing so, they remitted the question
of what is republican to the body most competent to decide that question-the
Congress-precisely because the Congress was the most republican branch' '9
of the newly established government, which was itself republican.120 Read as it
is written, the Clause thus suggests commitment of the question to the political
branches, primarily the Congress. Accordingly, it can be argued that a
republican form of government is whatever Congress decides a republican form
of government is. '2 Beyond this quick text-based argument, this subpart will
show that both through congressional action and judicial inaction, the Congress
118. In practical terms, the failure to further define the term "republic" might be said to
reflect the inability of the Framers to reach a consensus on what they meant. See supra notes
10-11 (discussing the historically abstract nature of the term "republican").
119. One might, of course, defend the Court in Madisonian terms as republican because it
derived its legitimacy from the people through the nomination and confirmation process; one
might also defend the Presidency as republican as elected by the people, albeit indirectly
through the Electoral College. But the most republican of the three branches, at least in the
sense that it contained the only component directly chosen by the people, was the House of
Representatives. See also supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (describing the manner in
which each branch was chosen).
120. The Constitution established the House as popularly elected, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
cl. I, and the Senate as chosen by state legislatures, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. I. (The selection
method was amended by the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution to allow for popular
election of Senators). Both houses were therefore elected--directly or indirectly, in Madison's
words-by the people. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
196 1). Who better, then, to decide whether a particular state's government was republican (or at
least republican in form) than the legislative branch, with the concurrence, if two-thirds in both
Houses cannot be achieved, of the president. Perhaps "it takes one to know one" was not the
phrase in vogue at the time, but the Framers committed the definition and determination of that
question to the body that ought to be most responsive to the people--4he branch whose interests
were to be served by the form of government being created.
121. See WIECEK, supra note 10, at 205 ("The guarantee clause ... is whatever a majority
of Congress wants to make of it."). In this view, the Framers did not avoid the definition of a
republic; rather, they left the task of defining the parameters of the capacious term republican to
be determined for each age by the most republican body extant. In this light we more clearly see
that Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable because, in the absence ofjudicially manageable
standards, the "political" questions belong to the "political" branch. This conclusion does not
suggest that all questions political in nature are nonjusticiable political questions. The political
question doctrine is discussed infra, in notes 260-65 and accompanying text. Even though
courts are charged with interpreting the laws, those matters that lack judicially manageable
standards, because they are political in nature, should be left to the political branch. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). In this rather common sense way, we can see that the Framers
left Guarantee Clause enforcement to the Congress.
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typically is the branch responsible for Guarantee Clause interpretation and
enforcement.
Judicial review of specific Congressional enforcement action helps us to
understand why Congress bears the primary enforcement responsibility. 122 The
Court first approached the question in Texas v. White. In that case, as discussed
earlier,12 1 the Court avoided any decision on the specifics of the various
Reconstruction Acts, and therefore the Court did not determine the extent to
which they were permissible exercises of federal power under the Guarantee
Clause. 24  Nevertheless, the Court clearly stated that federal statutes
implementing this power were subject to normal review for conformity to
constitutional limitations:
In the exercise of the power conferred by the guaranty clause, as in the
exercise of every other constitutional power, a discretion in the choice of
means is necessarily allowed. It is essential only that the means must be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power conferred,
through the restoration of the State to its constitutional relations, under a
republican form of government, and that no acts be done, and no authority
exerted, which is either prohibited or unsanctioned by the Constitution.'5
Accordingly, Congress has the enforcement power and may renew a
statute passed for the purpose of "guaranteeing" a. republican form of
government for any or all states to determine whether it employs a means
"necessary and proper" for that end.126
Most importantly, Congress has a particular expertise and ability to step in
to resolve problems of the political system' 27-something that is not the proper
122. At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, judicial review had not been created.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (establishing judicial review).
Therefore, the question of whether the Court could second-guess Congress's determination of
what it meant to be republican did not arise. Nor did Luther v. Borden address that question
because that case addressed only the issue of whether the Court would apply the Clause when
Congress had not acted. Similarly, later challenges to initiatives and referenda as being
antirepublican did not involve any act of Congress, and may be seen as the Court refusing to
embroil itself in a dispute that was the responsibility of another branch. See, e.g., Marshall v.
Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 258-59 (1913) (declining to rule on the Guarantee Clause aspects of a
challenge to a referendum to change Indiana's state constitution); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 135-36 (1912) (challenging a corporate tax that had been adopted
through an initiative).
123. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
124. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 731 (1868).
125. Id. at 729.
126. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819) (providing a well-known
explanation of the meaning of necessary and proper).
127. Given the recent passage of the BCRA, Congress has particular experience at the
moment. See supra note 3 (discussing the passage and the future of the BCRA).
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province of the courts. Not only does Congress have the right or duty to act
under the Court's blessings, the Court has stated that Congress is the proper
branch for resolving Guarantee Clause matters, 2 ' in part because it has the
experience. 1
29
Turning to specific enforcement actions, throughout the first half of the
19th century, Congress considered and exercised its powers under the Clause,
in the context of the admission of states and seating members of Congress. The
admission of Illinois, Missouri, and Nebraska bears out this point. In 1818, as
Illinois sought admission, Congress acted: The House delayed the seating of
the representative-elect until a determination could be made that the Illinois
constitution was republican. 3 ° Soon thereafter, in debating the Missouri
Compromise, Senators weighed congressional power to give meaning to the
Guarantee Clause, arguing whether slavery was consistent with the republican
form.13' In the context of admitting Nebraska, Congress conditioned admission
on the provision of political rights to blacks. In so doing, it expressly invoked
and acted on Guarantee Clause authority.
3 2
128. Recall the Court's statement in Luther: "[lit rests with Congress to decide what
government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee to each State a
republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the
State before it can determine whether it is republican or not." Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1,42 (1849).
129. Luther sheds some light, as it held that Congress retains the Guarantee Clause power:
"And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the
Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican
character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority." Id. Thus we see that Congress
has a particular authority to act, as established by cases from Luther v. Borden going forward.
But, if a court were to check or review (in whole or in part) that authority, the original
understanding of Congress's powers helps demonstrate the proper scope of congressional
action.
130. See 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 296 (1818) ("Mr. Poindexter of Mississippi, said he thought
it incumbent on the House, before admitting the Representative to a seat, to examine the
constitution just laid before it, to see... whether the form of government established was
republican, which the United States were bound to guaranty."). See also WIECEK, supra note
10, at 142 (recounting the same).
131. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 338-39 (1820); id. at 993-94. Justice Harlan had also raised
this point in his Plessy dissent. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563-64 (1896) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that racial segregation is "inconsistent with the guarantee given by the
Constitution to each State of a republican form of government").
132. For example, Senator Cresswell of Maryland argued that Congress has a right to
interpose conditions on a state when "necessary to secure the people of [the] State a republican
form of government." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 app. (1866). See also id. at 189-
90 (remarks of Sen. Johnson) (urging a more narrow construction); id. at 474-80 (detailing
extensive debate in the House of Representatives on same subject). In the context of the
Nebraska admission, William Wiecek has written: "The guarantee clause, after all, can be
enforced by statute, which is to say that it is whatever a majority of Congress wants to make it."
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After the Civil War, Congress again acted under its Guarantee Clause
authority. The members explicitly invoked the Clause and its interpretation in
Luther in the debate on the Reconstruction Acts.133 Congress acted under its
Guarantee Clause power, reflecting an affirmative belief that it held the
ultimate enforcement power. 134 Representative Winter Davis argued that the
Guarantee Clause "places in the hands of Congress the right to say what is and
what is not, with all the light of experience and all the lessons of the past,
inconsistent, in its judgment, with the permanent continuance of republican
government."' 35
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 205.
133. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 82-85 app. (1864) (remarks of Rep. Winter
Davis); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1865) (resolution of Sen. Charles Sumner);
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 72-75 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens).
Thaddeus Stevens argued that the Guarantee Clause provided authority to authorize temporary,
and ultimately permanent, governments in the former Confederacy: "It is obvious ... that the
first duty of Congress is to pass a law declaring the condition of these outside or defunct States,
and providing proper civil governments for them." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74
(1865). The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, ratified in 1868 and 1870 respectively,
could not provide the authority for the Reconstruction Acts, enacted in 1867.
134. Congress enacted these laws over the President's veto. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., I st Sess. 74 (1865) (noting the President's opposition to Congress on this issue). For an
interesting analysis, see Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of"Unconstitutional" Laws:
Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 908-09 (1994). May wrote:
Of the fifteen statutes enacted by Congress over his objection, fourteen were
opposed by [President Andrew] Johnson on constitutional grounds. Most of these
laws dealt with Reconstruction, a process which Johnson believed fell within the
executive province rather than that of Congress. According to Johnson, the eleven
rebellious states had never left the Union and were entitled to immediate
representation in the House and Senate. The Republican Congress thought
otherwise. Through a series of statutes adopted over Johnson's veto, the former
Confederacy was placed under military rule. Many of Johnson's vetoes rested on
the premise that Congress could not constitutionally legislate for the southern states
at a time when their representatives were excluded from the House and the Senate.
Though Johnson's constitutional opposition to these measures was deeply felt, he
more than once acknowledged that if a veto is overridden by Congress, the
President is bound to enforce the statute despite his constitutional misgivings.
Id.
135. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., I st Sess. 83 app. (1864). Davis articulated an aggressive
and broad vision of Congress's power in 1864:
The duty of guarantying means the duty to accomplish the result. It means that the
republican government shall exist. It means that every opposition to republican
government shall be put down. It means that everything inconsistent with the
permanent continuance of republican government shall be weeded out .... [A]nd
if, in its judgment, any form of policy is radically and inherently inconsistent with
the permanent and enduring peace of the country, with the permanent supremacy of
republican government, and it have the manliness to say so, there is no power,
judicial or executive, in the United States that can even question thisjudgment but
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Several southern states, attacking the laws in the Court, challenged
Congress's approach to the political matters involved in reuniting the
government. For example, the Reconstruction Acts authorized the national
government to intercede militarily in southern states "until loyal and republican
State governments could be legally established .... Mississippi challenged
this congressional enforcement of the guarantee in court, claiming that the
implementation of the federal statutes would destroy the state government.
137
The Supreme Court decided that the courts could not enjoin the President from
implementing an act of Congress on the ground that the act was itself alleged to
be unconstitutional. 138 Mississippi's challenge failed; Congress had taken
charge of Guarantee Clause enforcement, and the Court affirmed Congress's
position as enforcer. 1
32
Further, during this same period, some states objected to blacks being
given the franchise, 140 a question political in nature.'14 Specifically, Georgia
feared that under the Reconstruction Acts, it would be "Africanized" by the
inclusion of blacks in the body politic. 142 In other words, Georgia disagreed
with the political solution rendered by Congress in regard to reestablishing a
republican form of government. 143 The state called forjudicial intervention in a
the PEOPLE; and they can do it only by sending other Representatives here to undo
our work.
Id.
136. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 475 (1867). See also Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (first Reconstruction Act) (creating military districts and
establishing military authority in the rebel states).
137. Johnson, 71 U.S. at476.
138. Id. at 500-0 1. The Court, noting the broad discretion the President had to enforce the
acts, invoked "general principles which forbid judicial interference with the exercise of
Executive discretion." Id. at 499.
139. Id. at 500-01.
140. Herman Belz has provided interesting commentary on the subject. HERMAN BELZ, A
NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 175 (1976) (writing about the Reconstruction acts and suggesting that
"the way to protect blacks.., was to give every citizen the ballot"). See also FRANK J.
SCATURRO, THE SUPREME COURT'S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: A DISTORTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 10, 19 (2000) (describing a Congressional plan to require
southern states to enfranchise blacks and noting the Court's deferral to Congress on such
Reconstruction issues). Without the Fifteenth Amendment, ratified after the Reconstruction
Acts were enacted, Congress had to find some authority for acting.
141. This position was not new; it had been articulated in debates in the early 1800s. See
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 148 ("[Sen. James] Barbour and [William] Pinkney insisted that
republicanism did not imply civil and political equality, nor did it exclude caste."). While this
question is political in nature, it does not necessarily mean that it is a political question,
judicially speaking.
142. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 66 (1867).
143. Id. at 63-64.
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political question,'" "[fJor the rights for the protection of which [the court's]
authority is invoked, are the rights of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of
government, of corporate existence as a State, with al its constitutional powers
and privileges." 41 Precisely because the Court refused to decide this dispute
where a congressional enactment was at issue, Georgia v. Stanton'46 provides a
strong case for congressional enforcement of the Guarantee Clause. The Court
supported Congress's ability to determine the political form of governments by
declining to sit in judgment of an act of Congress intruding into state
government because a "political" question was involved.'
47
Texas also objected to the federal government actions to enforce the
guarantee. The federal government acted in two ways in Texas, first by the
President during the Civil War, in his constitutionally-defined role of
commander-in-chief. 141 Congress then passed the Reconstruction Acts' 49 to
reestablish republican forms of government in all former Confederate states. In
Texas v. White, the Court affirmed that the Guarantee Clause power was held
by the Congress, and that the Reconstruction Acts were a proper exercise of
such power. 50
Congress is the primary enforcer"' of the Guarantee Clause, and, by
acquiescing in Congress's political and legislative solutions, the Court has
affirmed'52 Congress's role.1
5 3
144. The Court described the bill as an effort "to restrain the defendants, who represent the
executive authority of the government, from carrying into execution certain acts of Congress,
inasmuch as such execution would annul, and totally abolish the existing State government of
Georgia, and establish another and different one in its place." Id. at 76.
145. Id. at 77.
146. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
147. However, the Court went on to indicate a limitation of its hands-off attitude: "No case
of private rights or private property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened infringement,
is presented . I..." Id. at 77. This statement indicates that judicial refusal to review federal
enactments under the Guarantee Clause may be limited to instances in which private interests
are not involved.
148. See U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 2, cl. I ("The president shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States.").
149. Reconstruction Acts, supra note 75.
150. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1868) ("[T]he power to carry into
effect the clause of guaranty is primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress."). See
also id. at 729 (deferring to Congress to do that which is necessary and proper to enforce the
guarantee).
151. See id. at 730 (quoting Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42) ("For, as the United States
guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what
government is established in the State, before it can determine whether it is republican or not.").
See also Kohler v. Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978, 982 (E.D. La. 1968) ("It is the duty of the
Congress and the President to uphold and defend portions of the Constitution that, for one
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C. Proactive Enforcement
Congress may act proactively to enforce the Guarantee Clause on behalf of
the United States. One way in which Congress has discharged its responsibility
is by refusing to seat representatives from states that do not have the requisite
republican government.1 54 At the same time, however, the Guarantee Clause is
not specifically linked to the provisions of Article I, section 5, governing that
power. Indeed, the mandate of the Clause is not reactive, in that its purpose is
reason or another, have not been considered appropriate areas for judicial action.").
152. Moreover, Texas v. White strongly suggests that the Court will review congressional
action under the Guarantee Clause deferentially, and subject to the question of whether the
means chosen are "necessary and proper" to the ends to be obtained. This conclusion of course
reflects on the broad interpretation of federal powers as declared in McCulloch v. Maryland:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adopted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and the spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power
"[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution... all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States").
153. While this Article proposes a significant role for the Congress, the President is not
without Guarantee Clause power. See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 10, at 301 ("The Supreme
Court in Luther v. Borden established beyond question that the guarantee power was invested
primarily in Congress and was delegable in some ways to the President."). The text speaks of
the "United States," thus allowing the President to act, even when the federal courts consider
Guarantee Clause matters nonjusticiable. In the example of Dorr's Rebellion, President Tyler
had prepared troops for action, in the event they were needed. See id. at 104-10 (describing
events before and after the rebellion). See also id. at 107 ("[President Tyler] confirmed the
widely held assumption that responsibility for execution of the dual promise of guarantee and
protection might sometimes fall on the President, as commander in chief of the armed forces,
rather than Congress."). But also in that context the President can be said to be acting under his
authority under the domestic violence clause, the back half of the Guarantee Clause that we do
not explore in these pages. "The United States shall ... on Application of the Legislature, or of
the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), [protect the States] against domestic
Violence." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Although the President may act, his actions may be
limited. When Lincoln appointed government officials in defeated rebel states after the Civil
War, he was clearly acting in pursuit of the Guarantee Clause mandate. Further, Mississippi v.
Johnson was actually an action against Andrew Johnson, who was enforcing the Reconstruction
Acts. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 475 (1867). But despite some action by
the President, the Congress has typically taken the lead, and the President, if anything, has
followed and the courts have deferred. Congress remains the primary enforcer.
154. The Constitution accords the power to each House of determining its membership and
expelling those who are not qualified. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1-2. This action occurred in
the examples of Illinois, Missouri, and Nebraska, discussed earlier. See supra notes 130-32,
and accompanying text (recounting arguments over those states' admission into the Union).
The sanction of depriving a state of its representation in the national government is a serious act,
likely to have enormous political and economic consequences.
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not to withhold recognition of a state that lacks the requisite government, but
rather it is proactive, to guarantee that government.
First, we explore the language and command of the Guarantee Clause and
ask: What does it mean to "guarantee?" A guarantee envisions a proactive
approach. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines "guarantee" as:
To be a guarantee, warrant, or surety for; spec. to undertake with respect to
(a contract, the performance of a legal act, etc.) that it shall be duly carried
out; to make oneself responsible for the genuineness of(an article); hence,
to assure the existence or persistence of; to set on a secure basis. 5
These meanings import the responsibility of the United States (acting, as
we have seen, through the Congress) to ensure the genuineness of state
republican governments. The OED includes two basically contemporaneous
usage examples that confirm this view: "1791 BURKE... Publick treaties
made under the sanction, and some of them guaranteed by the Sovereign
Powers of other nations. 18 LD. BROUGHAM (Ogilvie), By the treaty of alliance
she guaranteed the Polish constitution in a secret article."'156 In our specific
context, this reading is consistent with the language of Texas v. White, in which
the Court strongly implied that Congress could do whatever is necessary and
proper to implement its power (and duty) under the Guarantee Clause.'57 The
Guarantee power, thus conceived, is prophylactic.
Defining the proper exercise of that power with precision also will depend
upon the perceived threat to the republican form of government. In Luther v.
Borden, for example, it might have been sufficient had Congress simply
recognized one or the other of the competing governments." 8 In the direct
155. OxFoR.D ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at http://dictionary.oed/coml
cgi/entry/OO9815?querytype=word&queryword=guarantee&edition=2e&first=- &max to
show= I O&sort type=alpha&search id=COC5-1XguFn-135&hilite=00099815. Had the
Framers desired a reactive role for Congress, words like "repair" or "restore" might have been
more appropriate.
156. Id.
157. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729 (1868) (discussing Congress's duty
under the Guarantee Clause). As the Court stated:
In the exercise of the power conferred by the guaranty clause, as in the exercise of
every other constitutional power, a discretion in the choice of means is necessarily
allowed. It is essential only that the means must be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the power conferred, through the restoration of the state to
its constitutional relations, under a republican form of government, and that no acts
be done, and no authority exerted, which is either prohibited or unsanctioned by the
Constitution.
Id.
158. Recall that in Luther, the debate was over whether the original charter government or
the Dorrite government was properly the government of Rhode Island. The courts could then
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democracy cases,' 59 Congress (had it concluded that the republican form of
government was threatened) could have invalidated the referendum or the
initiative, leaving the courts to refuse to enforce "laws" which were passed by
such means.'60 Thus, we will also see that in some contexts, Congress may be
more or less proactive in its enforcement of the Clause.
Further, in Coyle v. Smith16 1 the Supreme Court held that the Guarantee
Clause requires that Congress has a duty of "seeing that [a republican state
government] is not changed to one anti-republican."'162 More creative uses of
the Guarantee Clause have also been argued. For example, one commentator
has contended that the enforcement of federal corruption laws against state and
local government officials could be justified under the Guarantee Clause, even
if other sources of federal power were insufficient. 163 Finally, in his definitive
work, Wiecek wrote: "The power to 'guarantee' is prophylactic as well as
reactive. The national government need not sit by an idle spectator to the loss
of republicanism. .. ."'6 Congress may act affirmatively and need not limit
itself to reacting to state governments that have lost their republican form.' 65
have applied normal common law principles to determine whether Luther or Borden was acting
lawfully.
159. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (discussing Pacific States and
Marshall).
160. See Catherine Engberg, Note, Taking the Initiative: May Congress Reform State
Initiative Lawmaking to Guarantee a Republican Form of Government?, 54 STAN. L. RFv. 569,
591 (2001) (concluding that "Congress could enact a nationwide ban on state initiative
lawmaking").
161. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
162. Id. at 567-68 (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 174 (1874)). The
Court considered the enforcement of the Guarantee in the context of a challenge to a move of
the capital of Oklahoma.
163. Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of
State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. Rav. 367, 415-16 (1989).
164. WIECEK, supra note 10, at 302.
165. The congressional responsibility thus echoes themes of the imminence and clear and
present danger tests from First Amendment jurisprudence. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (noting the limits on the states' prohibition of speech). The Court in
Brandenburg noted:
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.
Id.; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.").
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In sum, Congress bears the responsibility to enforce the Guarantee Clause
mandate-it has the experience and the expertise, and the courts have
acquiesced-and it may act prophylactically in so doing. In the next Part, the
Article will examine the specific issue of, and the Guarantee Clause connection
with, campaign finance reform.
IV. Campaign Reform Past, Present, and Future
The power of money in politics presents an unchecked threat to the
republican form of government. At present, the few with money maintain
disproportionate control at the expense of the many, and the elected official
betrays the responsibility of representation.' 66 There has been a significant
movement toward enacting campaign finance reform measures in recent years,
in response to the growing recognition that such efforts are necessary to protect
against the corrosive influence of money in politics and government.
67
Properly understood against this backdrop, campaign reform is about systemic
efforts to ensure a republican government that is responsive to the people.
While this Article asserts a new approach to campaign finance reform, first
we must consider the prevailing orthodoxy-Buckley v. Valeo.' 68 As will be
discussed in this Part, that decision set the standard in campaign finance reform
analysis by equating money and speech. 69 As a result, most subsequent
campaign finance reform legislation has had to satisfy strict scrutiny in order to
be held constitutional. 70 Accordingly, Buckley would pose a significant
166. See infra Part IV.B. I (discussing effect of money on the political process).
167. See infra notes 236-47 (citing studies that show money's effect).
168. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976).
169. See id. at 19 (contending that mass media exposure, which is expensive, is now an
"indispensable instrument[] of effective political speech"); Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken
Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1235,
1247 n.61 (2000) [hereinafter Overton, Mistaken Identity] (observing that "[a] number of
commentators have interpreted Buckley as equating money with speech"). But, Overton argues:
Contrary to popular opinion, Buckley's initial application of speech doctrine to
regulations of political money is not based on the logic that "money is speech"
(spending is the same thing as speaking). Rather, Buckley's application of speech
doctrine was premised on the rationale that money is so strictly necessary to
"effective political speech" that a restriction on money effectively constitutes a
restriction on speech. By analogy, although consuming gas is a different activity
than driving a car, a restriction on gas consumption necessarily limits how far one
can drive.
Id. at 1246-47 (citations omitted).
170. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (describing "broadest protection" of the First
Amendment).
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challenge to any congressional attempt to pass campaign finance reform under
the Guarantee Clause, as proposed in this Article. This Part will explore
Buckley and its progeny at the Supreme Court, followed by an examination of
state and local reform efforts and their reception in court. This exploration at
the end reveals a significant-but not impossible-First Amendment hurdle
that any campaign finance reform proposal will have to clear.
A. Buckley and Subsequent Supreme Court Interpretations
1. Buckley v. Valeo
In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
so that it had four major components, two of which merit exploration in this
context. First, the law set contribution limits, imposing $1,000 caps on
campaign contributions from individuals to candidates for federal office, and a
$5,000 limit on contributions by political committees to candidates.' In
addition, the law placed a $25,000 cap on total annual contributions for each
contributor.172  Second, the law set expenditure limits, (1) restricting the
amount an individual could spend "relative to a clearly identified candidate" to
$1,000; and (2) curbing the amounts that candidates or their families could
spend on their own election efforts: $50,000 for presidential and vice-
presidential candidates, $35,000 for Senate candidates, and $25,000 for House
candidates.
173
Early in its per curiam opinion, the Buckley Court declared the principle
that would guide its analysis, and that has become its signature:
The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the
most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation
of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in
order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes desired by the people.1
74
171. ld.at7,13n.12.
172. Id. at 7,13.
173. Id. at 13, 187-88. The law also created disclosure requirements and public funding
for presidential elections. id. at 7.
174. Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)).
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The Court not only reinforced the preeminence of political speaking as
fundamental First Amendment activity, it elevated political spending as well to
such higher status.'75 As with other laws that restrict core First Amendment
activity, these regulations would have to meet "exacting" or strict scrutiny,
requiring narrow tailoring to meet a compelling governmental interest.'
7 6
Two principal analyses followed from there, one as to expenditure limits
and the other regarding contribution limits. Campaign expenditures were seen
as central to the communication of political ideas.177 Consequently, the Court
observed that limitations would likely offend the First Amendment, because
restricting the amount of money spent on political communication reduces core
First Amendment political speech.' 78 The Court thus inexorably connected
political expenditures and protected First Amendment activities, invalidating
this attempt to limit such expenditures.7 9
While acknowledging that contributions also could be seen as speech, the
Court distinguished them from expenditures, by arguing that "[a] contribution
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but
does not communicate the underlying basis for the support." 80 This conclusion
effectively reduced the core speech value of contributions as compared to
expenditures and set the stage for the Court to uphold the federal statute's
specific contribution limits, but the Court had another step to make first. Even
if it was not core First Amendment activity, the government still must justify
burdening speech activity."' Here, the Court found that the corrupting
175. Campaign contributions and expenditures, thus described as political speech, hit at
"the central meaning of the First Amendment." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,273
(1964). See also Eu v. S. F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)
("[T]he First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a
campaign for political office." (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,272 (1971))).
176. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
177. Id. at 16-17, 19.
178. Id. at 19. The court considered the current nature of political spending:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.
Id.
179. See id. at 23 (finding that the Act's "expenditure ceilings impose... severe
restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association").
180. ld.at2l.
181. Content-based laws that affect speech will be subject to strict scrutiny and content-
neutral ones will be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (describing the standards for such laws).
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influence of money in politics 182 could provide a sufficiently powerful
justification for government regulation of speech. "To the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy
is undermined."' 8 3 Such quid pro quo corruption was not the only way to
justify contribution limits. "Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual
quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a
regime of large individual financial contributions.' 84 Either actual corruption
or the appearance thereof was deemed a sufficient governmental interest to
justify the government curbing this political speech. In sum, the Buckley Court
set a strict scrutiny standard and struck down expenditure limits but upheld
contribution limits.' 85
2. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has extended the Buckley framework over the last
several decades to apply to a wide array of campaign finance regulation. For
example, in Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee, 86 the Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a federal
statutory provision restricting spending by political action committees in
support of a presidential candidate.8 7 Because the expenditures were
182. This concern was particularly sensitive in the post-Watergate era.
183. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. Note also that in its concern for "our system of
representative democracy," the Court (presumably unintentionally) signals our Guarantee Clause
concern. Although this idea was not derived from an Article IV analysis, it does echo Guarantee
Clause themes.
184. Id. at 27.
185. See id. at 23 ("[A]lthough the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both
implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly
more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do
its limitations on financial contributions."). The Court also upheld public financing of
presidential elections and disclosure requirements. Id. at 58 n.66, 66-68.
186. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480
(1985).
187. Id. at 493-94. The Court found such independent expenditures to constitute core First
Amendment speech and any regulations had to be justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at
493; cf Cal. Med. Assoc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 195-97 (1981) (upholding a
Federal Election Campaign Act [hereinafter FECA] provision limiting the dollar amount of
contributions to a political action committee, reasoning that such contributions facilitated third-
party speech and were not speech in and of themselves, and finding that the contributions
therefore had limited First Amendment protection and could be regulated).
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independent of and not coordinated with any candidate, "' the Court found that
there was no danger of corruption and invalidated the restriction-it was not
justified by a compelling governmental interest. 89 In Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley,'90 the Court focused on the Buckley corruption
rationale, holding that absent an individual candidate, there was no risk of quid
pro quo corruption, and therefore there was insufficient constitutional
justification to restrict contributions to issues-related committees.' 9 ' These are
but two examples of Supreme Court cases in which Buckley has been applied,
with regulations failing strict scrutiny. Buckley strict scrutiny has also been
applied in many other contexts, including both independent' 92 and
coordinated' 93 political expenditures, corporate political contributions, 94 and
188. The FECA defines coordinated expenditures as "expenditures made... in
cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his
authorized political committees, or their agents." 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (2000).
189. Fed Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. at 497-98, 501.
190. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
191. Id. at 299-300. The facts of the case presented a ballot referendum, as opposed to the
election of a candidate. Id. at 292. The Court invalidated a $250 limitation on contributions to
a committee formed to oppose a ballot measure. Id. at 300. The Court held that the committee
was simply expressing political ideas and the contribution limit would directly affect
expenditures, thereby limiting the expression of such ideas. Id. at 299. Because such limits
cannot be placed on individuals' expenditures, the Court reasoned that they should not be
placed on those expenditures of individuals choosing to band together to express a common
viewpoint. Id. at 296.
192. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission, the Court extended the right of unlimited independent expenditures to political
parties. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,618
(1996) [hereinafter Colorado I].
193. When Colorado I came back before the Court five years later, the Court clarified that
any coordinated expenditures by a political party are functionally contributions and may be
limited consistent with the First Amendment. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001) [hereinafter Colorado I].
194. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (invalidating a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting all corporate contributions or expenditures used to influence
the outcome of such referenda). The Court concluded that the statute restricted core First
Amendment speech, id. at 776, regardless of whether the source was an individual or a
corporation. Id. at 784. Corporate contributions and expenditures could only be limited to
serve a compelling state interest, which the Court found lacking. See id. at 788-95 (countering
the arguments that found such an interest). The Court did leave open the possibility that with a
different record, a different result might follow:
According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may
drown out other points of view. If appellee's arguments were supported by record
or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine
democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment
interests, these arguments would merit our consideration. But there has been no
showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even
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contributions to Political Action Committees (PACs).'95 The result, more often
than not, strikes down a law. Above all, the lesson is that the Buckley First
Amendment strict scrutiny framework, including the expenditure-contribution
dichotomy, has controlled subsequent Supreme Court campaign finance reform
decisions.
While Buckley has controlled the Court's analysis since 1976, there has
been increasing discontent on the Court about the case. 196 Justice Thomas has
viewed Buckley as too permissive of campaign reform; he has argued that
contribution limits suppress speech and should be subject to strict scrutiny the
way expenditure limits are, and both are unconstitutional. 197 Justice Kennedy
has expressed dissatisfaction with the impact of Buckley's split decision, as it
bans expenditure limits but allows contribution limits.'9" Taking the view that
significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has been any
threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government.
Id. at 789-90 (citations omitted). In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), using Buckley's corruption rationale, the Court found a
FECA provision prohibiting corporations from using general treasury funds for expenditures to
be unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit corporation. Id. at 263. Because the corporate
defendant was formed to disseminate political ideas, not amass capital, as such, it was not the
type of organization that had been the focus of regulation of corporate political activity. Id. at
259. However, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court
upheld a Michigan statute prohibiting corporations from using general treasury funds for
political expenditures. Id. at 666. The Court found that the statute was sufficiently narrowly
tailored to maintain the integrity of the electoral process because the statute prevented only
expenditures from a corporation's general treasury, but allowed for expenditures from a
segregated political fund. Id. at 660.
195. Cal. Med. Assoc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 193-99 (1981)
(considering the constitutionality of a FECA provision limiting contributions to PACS).
196. There have been mixed signals. For example, even while individual Justices
expressed discontent in their opinions, the Court affirmed Buckley's vitality and applied it in
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government Political Action Committee, 528 U.S. 377, 397-98
(2000). But unlike many other cases applying Buckley strict scrutiny, the Court upheld state
contribution limits. See id. (finding that Buckley supports Missouri's limitations on
contributions).
197. See Colorado 11, 533 U.S. at 465-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling for an
overruling of Buckley). Justice Thomas stated:
As an initial matter, I continue to believe that [Buckley] should be overruled.
Political speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection, and it is the
lifeblood of a self-governing people. I remain baffled that this Court has extended
the most generous First Amendment safeguards to filing lawsuits, wearing profane
jackets, and exhibiting drive-in movies with nudity, but has offered only tepid
protection to the core speech and associational rights that our Founders sought to
defend.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The phrase "lifeblood of a self-governing
people" quite clearly echoes Guarantee Clause principles.
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Buckley is too restrictive of legislative attempts at campaign reform, Justice
Stevens has found fault with the entire Buckley analysis because "[m]oney is
property; it is not speech."' 99  Similarly, Justice Breyer has challenged the
money-as-speech premise, suggesting a need to reconsider Buckley based on the
proposition that money is not speech, but rather enables it. 200 With such
divergent opinions, there is no consensus that Buckley should be overruled, and
even if so, what standard should supplant the Buckley framework. 20 1 In any
case, Buckley remains a formidable barrier to campaign reform advocates, even
though not all campaign finance reform efforts have been found
unconstitutional.202
B. State and Local Campaign Finance Reform Attempts & Court Reactions
States and localities have tried to reform their campaign machineries,
attempting to return the process to their citizens and to ensure the election of
198. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 406 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he compromise the Court invented in Buckley set the stage for a
new kind of speech to enter the political system. It is covert speech. The Court has forced a
substantial amount of political speech underground, as contributors and candidates devise ever
more elaborate methods of avoiding contribution limits ...."). Justice Kennedy specifically has
called for overruling Buckley, thereby "free[ing] Congress or state legislatures to attempt some
new reform, if, based upon their own considered view of the First Amendment, it is possible to
do so." Id. at 409-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring). Therefore, unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens
would be more likely to find limits constitutional. See generally Overton, Mistaken Identity,
supra note 169, at 1241 (building on Stevens's dissent and "contend[ing] that courts should
consider both speech doctrine and property doctrine in developing a new way to look at
campaign finance").
200. See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburgjoined this
opinion.
201. In other words, the irony is that there have been six votes to overturn Buckley,
although in fractured directions. Further, it is also possible that the Court may uphold a
campaign finance measure without overruling Buckley. Although Buckley rejected specific
limits, it did not close the door to upholding some limits, if supported by new facts and interests.
For example, in Landell v. Vermont Public Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.
2002), the Second Circuit recently upheld Vermont's campaign finance reform statute, based in
large part upon the extensive factual record developed in the legislature and in the trial court.
That opinion, however, has since been withdrawn for possible amendment. Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Breyer, and Ginsburg may provide four votes to hear a case like Landell (which,
combined with Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998), may provide at least
the seeds of a circuit split). Justice Thomas is far less predisposed to uphold any regulation of
campaign financing, but he still has an interest in hearing such a case.




officials who are responsive to their communities. °3 When such campaign
finance reform measures have been challenged in court, Buckley has
controlled.24 This subpart discusses how campaign reform can protect the
republican form of government, then surveys specific efforts at the state and
local level, and ultimately reviews the courts' reactions to such legislation.
1. The American Republic and Campaign Reform
This Article posits that campaign reform can protect the republican form
of government from the subversive effects of big money. As we consider that
hypothesis, we must examine the underlying proposition that at present, the few
maintain a disproportionate sway over elected representatives and the
representative is more likely to exercise judgment on behalf of the few than on
behalf of the many.' 5 The influence of the few deprives the people of their
representation and diminishes the republic.2° In order for the republic to be
truly representative, the people must have control of their choices-not simply
203. See infra Part IV.B.2 (cataloging state and local efforts at reform).
204. See infra Part IV.B.3 (reporting the courts' adherence to Buckley).
205. Bill Bradley offered the following assessment:
[N]othing breaks down trust in democracy as powerfully and surely as money. The
truest model of how our republic is supposed to work is citizens speaking to their
representatives and representatives responding to their constituents' voices and
concerns. Big money gets in the way of that. It's like a great stone wall separating
us from our representatives in Congress and making it almost impossible for them
to respond to our commonsense request that they address the profound issues that
affect all of us ....
BILL BRADLEY, THE JOURNEY FROM HERE 85-86 (2000).
206. In addition, the money race in campaigns narrows the ultimate choices the people
have in whom they elect. The need for large sums of money to mount a viable campaign
reduces and eliminates competition. Uncertain of their ability to raise the necessary amount of
money, many potential candidates forego politics. Further, massive "war chests" that
incumbents (and others) often amass have had the impact of scaring away would-be opponents.
This equality concern also skews the republican form of government. See Jamin Raskin & John
Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed
Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1170-74 (1994) (arguing that the current system of
elections and politics creates wealth disparity and inequalities); THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, DOLLARS AND
DEMOCRACY 3 (2000) ("The enormous burdens of fundraising on elected officials and
candidates discourage many potentially serious candidates from participating in elections."); see
generally Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign
Finance, 80 TEX. L. REv. 987 (2002) (arguing that the current political system has a
disproportionately negative impact on participation and representation of people of color).
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by voting, but through having their representatives reflect their interests, not
those whose financial support enabled their election.
20 7
In Reynolds v. Sims, 20 8 the Court observed that the individual right to vote
was at the "heart of representative government."20 9  Dilution of that right
directly threatens representative government. 2'0 Today, there is another type of
dilution of political power: The will of the people is not done because of the
influence of lobbyists, PACs, and others who control large sums of campaign
cash. Efforts at gun control, 21 prescription drug benefit reform,21 2 corporate
207. This conclusion also suggests that we should be concerned with the power and wealth
of lobbyists, arguably more than with campaign contributions that, whatever their size, are
dwarfed by the amounts spent to secure favors from the representatives once in office. Without
denying the importance of that perspective, the focus of this Article is on campaign finance
reform, and the lobbyist issue must be reserved for another day.
208. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
209. Id. at 555.
210. See id. ("[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise.").
211. See BRADLEY, supra note 205, at 86-87 (explaining the effect of money). Bradley
argued:
At times, money does more than shape the agenda. It has specific consequences
that run counter to the public good. Take handguns: Every day they kill twelve
children in America. Seventy-two percent of Americans favor mandatory licensing
of handguns, but Congress seems to find any excuse not to do something about
it .... On the face of it, this doesn't make sense-until you notice the fact that in
1998, the National Rifle Association gave nearly $2 million to various members of
Congress ....
Id.
212. The AARP (arguably one of the most successful "special interest" lobbies) has argued:
As consumers press lawmakers to reduce prescription drug costs and make
medications affordable for more people, drugmakers are fighting many such efforts
every inch of the way. The brand-name drug industry is waging this battle with one
thing it has plenty of-money. For years it has been by far the richest [industry] in
America ....
Patricia Barry, Drug Industry Spends Huge Sums Guarding Prices, AARP BULLETIN ONLINE, at
http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/departments/2002/medicare/05 10 medicare_ I. html (May 2002).
Another advocacy group has argued:
The prescription drug industry is spending approximately $230 million this election
cycle on lobbying, campaign contributions and issue ads as it tries to shape public
policy in the face of increasing public hostility to its price-gouging and
profiteering.
It's clear why the drug industry has gone on such a political spending spree.
Prescription drug coverage and costs, particularly for the elderly, have become a
leading if not the leading issue in election campaigns this year .... Consumers are
demanding that Congress provide Medicare drug coverage and drug price relief for
the elderly and the drug industry is resisting, with all its might.
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reform,2'3 tobacco regulation,2'4 environmental and energy regulation,"' and
campaign reform 16 all are being or have been stalled, despite popular sentiment
in favor of reform.217 As a result, according to one poll, "two-thirds (67%) of
U.S. adults believe that the political influence of giant corporations, such as
tobacco companies, weakens our democracy. 2 18 This perception is a sure sign
of a republican government in crisis.
The drug industry's investment has paid off handsomely as the industry's special-
interest clout has kept the Republican-controlled Congress from providing
prescription drug coverage through Medicare.
Rx Industry Goes for KO: Drug Companies Spend Record Amount This Election Cycle, PUBLIC
CITIZEN, at http://www.citizen.org/congress/reform/drugindustry/articles.cfm?ID=799 (Nov.
2000) (citations omitted).
213. Major corporate reform became reality apparently only because of the unstoppable
tide in the aftermath of scandals at Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, and more. See
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2002, at A l (reporting the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to various corporate
frauds). A Gallup poll showed the people's concerns about whose interest was being
represented in Washington. A large majority of Americans believe that politically powerful
members of Congress who set the legislative agenda "are more interested in protecting the
interests of large corporations." Little Political Fallout From Business Scandals, GALLUP
ORGANIZATION, July 8, 2002, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr020708.asp.
214. For a description of the ways in which the tobacco industry has lobbied for its
positions, see The CALA Files: The Secret Campaign by Big Tobacco and Other Major
Industries to Take Away Your Rights, PUBLIC CITIZEN, at http://www.citizen.org/
congress/civjus/tort/industry/articles.cfm?ID=800 (last visited July 8, 2003).
215. An article published by the United Auto Workers (a union with considerable political
influence in its own right) has argued that "judging by public opinion polls, if Congress really
delivered what voters say they want ... [f]unding for the environment and clean energy would
go up." Robert Kuttner, What Voters Really Want, UAW ONLINE, at http://www.uaw.org/
atissue/02/022 ! 02kuttner.html (Feb. 21, 2002).
216. The proponents of major reform fought for change for well over a decade. One writer
commented: "[P]owerful economic forces in this country have mobilized to make sure that
neither party seriously offers voters what they say they want. The immense difficulty Congress
has had in enacting even a tepid form of campaign finance reform to limit big money in politics
underscores this reality." Id.
217. Although the representative must act in the best interest of the constituency, that does
not necessarily mean that the representative should only act according to popular sentiment.
But when the popular sentiment is consistently thwarted, we must ask why.
218. Columbia/HCA Committing to Limit Its Political Influence: Seeks Way Out Of Hall
Of Shame, INFACT, at http://www.infact.org/52500hca.htm (May 25, 2000). See also BROOKS
JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT, BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 320 (rev. ed.
1990) ("Voters seem to sense their diminished influence."); DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra
note 206, at 3 ("The widespread and highly publicized evasions of the campaign finance laws
insult the integrity of our legal system and contribute to the public's deep and growing cynicism
about the campaign finance process, and about the very legitimacy of our democracy itself.");
LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS, THE PERSISTENCE OF
CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (1996) ("Americans have lost faith in the system that
sustains their democracy, believing that it serves special interests more than the general
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Further, monied individuals, corporations, and special interests wield
power proportionate to their access to money but disproportionate to their
numbers.219 The unequal influence imperils the republic because the people
cannot match resources with monied interests who have their will done in
Congress. 220 The impact of big money threatens the republic.
While far more people can vote today than when the Constitution was
ratified,22' popular sovereignty, if safe at the ballot box, is thus frustrated in
citizenry.").
219. Senator John McCain put the issue into relief against the backdrop of both the 2000
presidential elections and the legislation he was sponsoring to change the campaign finance
system:
After one of the closest elections in our nation's history, there's one thing the
American people are unanimous about-they want their government back. We can
do that by ridding politics of large, unregulated contributions that give special
interests a seat at the table while average Americans are stuck in the back of the
room.
McCain, Feingold, Cochran Introduce Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Of 2001, at
http://www.senate.gov/-feingold/releases/0l/0l/ 200112345.html (Jan. 22, 2001).
220. One commentator wrote:
Ordinary citizens are unable to match this influence which is all too frequently
directed to frustrate legislation which protects their rights, which gives them legal
remedies, or which holds corporations accountable. Citizens [sic] groups believe
that this factor more than any other is responsible for politician's [sic] failure to
address critical issues and for the impotence of state regulators who serve these
politicians. Available data suggests that voting in congress closely follows the
money donated to political coffers.
J. Michael Wynne, Integrated Health Services and Political Influence, at
http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/dissent/documents/health/ihspolitical.html (Jan. 2001).
221. The founding-era idea of a white male freeholder as voter does not comport with the
modem day notion. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I (prohibiting the denial of suffrage based
on race or a previous condition of servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § I (extending voting
rights to women); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § I (prohibiting poll taxes); U.S. CONST. amend.
XXVI, § I (granting eighteen-year-olds the right to vote); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S 204, 213 (1970) (concluding that a property requirement for voters in a limited purpose
election violated Equal Protection Clause); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706
(1969) (same); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (holding
unconstitutional a statute that restricted a school district election to property owners and
parents); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (finding a poll tax violated
the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). As one writer noted:
If one were to equate "the People" in the newly-created American republic with
those persons who actually voted for their representatives in state legislatures and
Congress, the source of sovereign power in the new nation was not widely
dispersed. Women did not vote. Most blacks did not vote. In most states
eligibility for suffrage was conditioned on the possession of freehold land. . . or the
possession of other property valued over a designated amount. Although these
suffrage conditions broke down over time, for a good portion of the nineteenth
century they had the effect of limiting the suffrage to freehold-owning white males.
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
terms of the role of the people's representatives. The focus of campaign
reform, in terms of guaranteeing a republican form of government, is on the
systemic dilution of the people's ability to choose their representatives who
will, in turn, be responsive to them. Although individuals still enjoy the vote,
the republican form of government is threatened.222 If the unelected few-
primarily wealthy individuals, corporations, and special interests-continue to
tighten their grasp on the process, 223 government becomes less and less
responsive to the people; the elected officials must be responsive to the best
interests of the people.224 Meaningful campaign reform can help us on the path
to a system where elected officials act in the best interest of the community that
they represent, not special interests. 5 The Article will next show how the
states have tried to correct these problems through campaign reform.
White, supra note 12, at 796.
The individual right to vote has changed dramatically over time and such shifting sands
cannot form the foundation for building a solid sense of popular sovereignty. Further, if we
focus too myopically on the individual right to vote, we lose sight of the representational aspect
of popular sovereignty. See also Edward A. Hartnett,A "Uniform and Entire" Constitution; Or,
What if Madison Had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 276 (1998) (detailing a uniform and
entire Constitution and positing that the vote-related Amendments belong together and could be
incorporated into the text of Constitution alongside the Guarantee Clause). Hartnett continues:
"[B]y setting limits on exclusion from political participation, [these Amendments] help to define
what a truly representative government entails. Thus all four should be placed at the end of
Article IV, section 4.... " Id.
222. Senator Russell Feingold said: "The extraordinary spending in the 2000 election
gives monied interests more influence on the Congress and the President than ever before. The
voices of average Americans have been drowned out by the deafening racket of campaign cash."
McCain, Feingold, Cochran Introduce Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, at
http://www.senate.gov/-feingotd/ releases/01/01/200112345.html (Jan. 22, 2001).
223. As a point of historical comparison, Thomas Paine complained as follows about the
government of England: "Sir William Meredith calls it a republic; but in its present state it is
unworthy of the name, because the corrupt influence of the crown, by having all the places in its
disposal, hath so effectually swallowed up the power .... ." PAINE, supra note 19, at 121. Also,
recall the discussion earlier that initial English understandings of representative government
eschewed special interest representation. Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
224. Alexander Hamilton's comments on slavery shed some light: "The only distinction
between freedom and slavery consists in this: In the former state, a man is governed by the laws
to which he has given his consent, either in person, or by his representative: In the latter, he is
governed by the will of another." ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A Full Vindication of the Measures of
Congress, in I THtE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 54, at 45, 47.
225. Bill Bradley aptly described the situation:
In a curious way, money in politics turns everyone into an interest group. You're a
gun owner or a trial lawyer or a tobacco company, each with your own fund-raising
machine, or you're in the great ranks of the nongivers, with no voice at all. One of
the consequences of this dichotomy is that when voters don't get the results they
want, they feel cheated and ignored. When you believe that influence drives the
process, and you don't win, you believe that someone else's influence has trumped
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2. State and Local Reform Efforts
Importantly, scores of legislative bodies have made the determination that
reform is needed, and the courts should accord some deference to those
findings. A review of the legislative efforts reveals that dozens of states and
well over 100 localities have made significant changes in their campaign
finance laws. 6 A brief survey uncovers several common statutory goals that
echo themes of preserving the republican form of government.227
yours, and your trust in your government diminishes. It's at this point that many
Americans lose interest and become cynical about politics in general. Politicians
are increasingly viewed as controlled by special-interest money that endangers their
integrity ....
BRADLEY, supra note 205, at 87-88.
226. In March 2000, one organization reported:
" Since 1990, 30 states have radically changed their campaign finance laws, 17 of
them between 1995 and 1998.
* From 1972 until the 1996 elections, at least 45 initiatives and/or referenda, as
weir as constitutional and charter amendments on election reform, were placed
on the ballot. In 36 of these cases, a majority of voters supported enactment.
* With voters approving ballot initiatives in Massachusetts and Arizona in the
1998 elections, these two states will join the 22 that already have statutes on the
books providing some sort of public financing for election campaigns. Some
12 states and New York City now have some form of expenditure limitations.
Campaign Finance: State and Local Overview, at http://www.campaignfinancesite.
org/structure.statesl .html (last visited July 1, 2003); see also NATIONAL CiVic LEAGUE, LOCAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, at http://www.ncl.org/npp/lcfr/ inventory.html (last updated Feb.
2002) (indexing reforms). But see Massachusetts Legislature Repeals Clean Elections Law,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2003, at A 16 (discussing the repeal of the Massachusetts law). The repeal
measure became an amendment to the state's compromise budget by voice vote. Id.; H.B. 1457,
183rd Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2003), available at http://www.state.ma.us/legis/history/h01457.htm (last
visited Aug. 26, 2003).
227. In so doing, the legislative body often makes declarations of findings to support the
ultimate restriction on campaign financing. As one example, Arizona's statute reads as follows:
16-940. Findings and declarations.
A. The people of Arizona declare our intent to create a clean elections system
that will improve the integrity of Arizona state government by diminishing the
influence of special-interest money, will encourage citizen participation in the
political process, and will promote freedom of speech under the U.S. and Arizona
Constitutions. Campaigns will become more issue-oriented and less negative
because there will be no need to challenge the sources of campaign money.
B. The people of Arizona find that our current election-financing system:
i. Allows Arizona elected officials to accept large campaign contributions
from private interests over which they have governmental jurisdiction;
2. Gives incumbents an unhealthy advantage over challengers;
3. Hinders communication to voters by many qualified candidates;
4. Effectively suppresses the voices and influence of the vast majority of
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First and foremost, in their reform efforts the states seek to reduce the
disproportionate influence of special interest wealth. To illustrate, in its
campaign finance reform statute, the Colorado legislature declared: "[L]arge
campaign contributions to political candidates allow wealthy contributors and
special interest groups to exercise a disproportionate level of influence over the
political process." '228 Next, states enact reform measures in order to reduce the
costs of campaigning that deter qualified candidates from running for office.
Again using Colorado as an example, the 16gislative declaration of its campaign
reform statute states that "the rising costs of campaigning for political office
prevent qualified citizens from running for political office; and that the interests
Arizona citizens in favor of a small number of wealthy special interests;
.5. Undermines public confidence in the integrity of public officials;
6. Costs average taxpayers millions of dollars in the form of subsidies and
special privileges for campaign contributors;
7. Drives up the cost of running for state office, discouraging otherwise
qualified candidates who lack personal wealth or access to special-interest funding;
and
8. Requires that elected officials spend too much of their time raising funds
rather than representing the public.
Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940 (West Supp. 2002). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-45-
102 (West 2002) (noting the problems money injects into elections); MASSACHUSETrS CLEAN
ELECTIONS LAW, St. 1998, c. 395 § I (a)(7) (same) (repealed 2003); 1997 Vt. Acts & Resolves
64, § I (listing legislative findings) (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 §§ 2801-83)
(2002).
228. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-45-102 (West 2002). See also Massachusetts Clean
Elections Law, St. 1998, c. 395 § I(a)(5) (finding a diminished accountability to the people)
(codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55A, §§ 1-18 (West 1999) (repealed
2003)); SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.04.450(A) (1978), http://www.clerk.ci.
seattle.wa.us./-public/codel .htm. Vermont's General Assembly found that "[s]ome candidates
and elected officials respond to contributors who make large contributions in preference to those
who make small ones." 1997 Vt. Acts & Resolves 64, § l(a)(2). In interpreting the Seattle
statute, the Washington Supreme Court found that it was "clearly intended to express in general
terms ... that in the electoral process the public interest as expressed through the ballot box
should prevail over special and private interests." City of Seattle v. State, 668 P.2d 1266, 1274
(Wash. 1983) (citing SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE art. 18, § 4). See also Homans v. City
of Albuquerque, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1273 (D.N.M. 2001) (noting that the city sought to
ensure that "ordinary citizens, not just the very wealthy, can run for office in Albuquerque
without having to receive large sums of money from special interest groups"); State v. Alaska
Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597,608 (Alaska 1999) (considering the State's argument that
the statute was enacted in an effort to ensure that the "corporate voice" is prevented "from
overwhelming individuals' voices... in leveling the playing field" (citing Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658--61 (1990))); Daniel Ortiz, Introduction to THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AT WORK: CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION, in
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 63-66 (1997) (exploring recent Supreme Court
campaign finance jurisprudence).
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of the public are best served by limiting campaign contributions." '229 Further,
state reforms often are designed to restore waning public confidence in the
electoral process, 230 as in Vermont, where enactment of campaign reform was
designed to combat "the appearance that candidates and elected officials will
not act in the best interests of Vermont citizens., 23 These reform efforts also
invoke concepts like enhancing and ensuring representative democracy.232 In
sum, the states clamor for reform because they see the system-the republican
form of govemment-being corrupted. The states connect the demise of the
system with campaign finance reform and attempt to break out of the cycles of
politics that exist today.233
229. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-45-102 (West 2002). Like Colorado, one purpose of
Massachusetts's campaign finance reform law is to "creat[e] genuine opportunities for qualified
residents of the Commonwealth to run for State office, and [to] encourage more competitive
elections." Bates v, Dir. of the Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 763 N.E.2d 6, 22 (Mass.
2002) (citing Massachusetts Clean Elections Law, St. 1998, c. 395 § I (b)(I) (repealed 2003)).
Note also that in Bellotti, the Supreme Court wrote that "confidence of the citizenry in
government" would be a compelling governmental interest that couldjustify campaign finance
reform. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978).
230. For example, the Vermont legislature declared, "Robust debate of issues, candidate
interaction with the electorate, and public involvement and confidence in the electoral process
have decreased as campaign expenditures have increased." 1997 Vt. Acts & Resolves 64,
§ l(a)(4) (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 §§ 2801-83 (West 2001)).
23 1. Id. § I(a)(9). In a similar vein, in Homans the U.S. District Court found-that "[t]he
record [was] clear that the vast majority of residents of Albuquerque, indeed seventy-one
percent, feel that spending limits improve the fairness of elections." Homans v. City of
Albuquerque, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1273 (D.N.M. 2001).
232. The Massachusetts campaign finance reform statute stated an intention to "enhance
democracy" by "restoring the rights of citizens of all backgrounds to equal and meaningful
participation in the democratic process." Bates v. Dir. of the Office of Campaign Political Fin.,
763 N.E.2d 6, 22 (Mass. 2002) (citing Massachusetts Clean Elections Law, St. 1998, c. 395
§ I (b)(I) (repealed 2003)). The city of Seattle adopted a campaign finance reform initiative in
an "attempt[] to ensure a representative democracy." City of Seattle v. State, 668 P.2d 1266,
1271 (Wash. 1983) (citing SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE art. 18, § 4 (effective Nov. 2,
1976)). Further, as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explained in Bates, "[t]he
fundamental premise of the clean elections law is that government is more responsive to the
people to the extent that its chosen representatives are free from the influence of those providing
financial largesse." Bates, 763 N.E.2d at 22. As one commentator noted, the Massachusetts
Clean Elections Law seeks to "affirm the principle of 'one person, one vote' and give all citizens
meaningful participation in the democratic process." MASS. VOTERS FOR CLEAN ELECTIONS, THE
CLEAN ELECTIONS LAW, at http://www.massvoters.org/TheCleanElectionsLaw.html (last
visited July 1, 2003).
233. Massachusetts provides an interesting tale, in that its Clean Elections Law was passed
by voter referendum but repealed by the legislature with the governor's acquiescence. See
Massachusetts Legislature Repeals Clean Elections Law, supra note 226, at A 16 (discussing the
repeal of the Massachusetts law).
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The legislative findings and judicial interpretations, as just discussed,
reflect a belief that money has a corrosive effect on republican politics and
governance.234 Social science research verifies that the states have good reason
to act, demonstrating a link between campaign contributions and influence in
government.2 " For example, the most recent such study examined voting
patterns on financial services legislation 236 as compared to contributions to
members of Congress. 237 The study looked at legislation with banking,
234. While the evidence, both statistical and anecdotal, is very persuasive, admittedly the
connection between contributions and the political position can never be proven beyond all
possible doubt. There is a sort of chicken and egg problem that asks "whether contributions
follow positions or positions follow contributions." Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests
Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J.L. & ECON. 345,
349 (2002) [hereinafter Stratmann, Financial Services]. In other words, does a contributor
contribute because the candidate has taken (or has promised to take) a position on a particular
issue, or does the candidate take (or promise to take) the position because the contributor has
made the contribution to the candidate? Such a proposition can never be proved absolutely, but
as we now see, there is very strong evidence, both from social science and from less formal
observations of the process, that supports the basic proposition that money influences candidates
and elected officials. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Silberman & Gary C. Durden, Determining
Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach, 84 J. POL. ECON. 317
(1976) (suggesting a strong correlation between contributions and voting patterns). But cf
Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous
Probit-Tobit Model, 64 REv. ECON. & STAT. 77 (taking the opposite position and specifically
refuting Durden and Silberman); cf Jeffrey Milyo et al., Corporate PAC Campaign
Contributions in Perspective, 2(l) Bus. AND POL. 75 (2000) (acknowledging the wide literature
establishing money-votes correlation and equating it with bribery, but nonetheless challenging
the true effectiveness of corporate political contributions). The Supreme Court in Shrink Mo.
observed that while there are differing perspectives, "there is little reason to doubt that
sometimes large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason
to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters." Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 395 (2000).
235. In addition to the econometric analyses to be discussed, there has been a significant
amount of anecdotal study reflecting the principle that money has a significant impact on the
process. For example, one book describes the rise and fall of Tony Coelho from politics,
offering the following assessment: "The system of money-based elections and lobbying rewards
those who cater to well-funded interests, both by keeping them in office and allowing
[legislators] to enrich themselves while they serve." JACKSON, supra note 218, at 320. In
commenting on the ignominious end of Coelho's House career, Jackson writes, "Coelho's
departure, of course, changed nothing. He left intact a deeply rooted system of money-based
politics. It had molded his career and it brought him down, and it continued to flourish after he
was gone." Id. at 318. "More than ever, members of Congress are political freebooters,
financially beholden not to their party but to scores of favor-seeking groups." Id.at 321. Larry
Sabato and Glenn Simpson have also written persuasively about the "Keating Five" savings and
loan scandal as an example of the types of problems which abound. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra
note 218, at 5-9.
236. Stratmann, Financial Services, supra note 234.
237. The researchers examined a legislative area where candidates had not necessarily
previously articulated positions. The absence of a prior position statement can help create a
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insurance, and investment components at three different points in time in the
1990s. 238 Having so many different votes on different but related subjects at
various points of time allowed researchers to more readily analyze any patterns
and correlations between political contributions and votes. 239 Further, the study
controlled for party affiliation. 240  The study concluded unambiguously:
"[Ilnterest groups 'buy' legislators' votes with PAC contributions. 241 A
similar study analyzed campaign contributions and subsequent voting patterns
for ten different congressional votes on agricultural price supports and
quotas.242 The study found that politicians were particularly responsive to the
dictates of contributors2 43 and that contributions more recent in time had the
greatest effect.2" And most starkly, the study revealed that the power of money
could be equated with the ultimate success of specific legislative measures:
"[W]ithout campaign contributions farm interest would have lost in five of the
seven votes that were won." 245 In addition to the vote-specific analyses, other
clean canvas, so to speak, in that it may be less likely that the contributor donated money
because of previous knowledge as to a certain position and can thus enable researchers to more
readily determine whether the candidate takes a position that follows the money. Id. at 349-50.
238. Id. at 357-65.
239. Id. at 367.
240. See id. at 360-61 (explaining the format of the study). Stratmann states:
The fact that the basic results hold up when the regressions are run separately for
each party suggests that the findings in our other tables are not caused by parties
forcing their members to switch their voting behavior but by individual legislators
changing their votes in response to changes in contributions.
Id.
241. Id. at 368.
242. Thomas Stratmann, Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the
Timing of Contributions Matter?, 77 REv. ECON & STAT. 127, 129 (1995) [hereinafter
Stratmann, Timing].
243. See id. at 135 ("The results confirm the qualitative and quantitative importance of
campaign contributions.").
244. See id. (reporting findings). Stratmann noted:
[T]he findings suggest that campaign contributions from not only one period, but
from at least two periods, are important for legislative voting. Contributions that
are given at approximately the same time as the vote have a larger impact on the
congressional voting behavior than contributions that the legislator received to win
the last popular election.
Id.
245. Id. at 127. See also Christopher Magee, Campaign Contributions, Policy Decisions,
and Election Outcomes, A Study of the Effects of Campaign Finance Reform, 64 THE JEROME
LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE PUBLIC POLICY BRIEF 7, 37 (200 1) (making the
similar finding that in terms of"House support for NAFTA, cuts in defense spending, and gun
control ... PAC money appeared to be decisive on these issues"). This conclusion does not
suggest that in all cases all votes of Congress are up for grabs, depending on the marginal and
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studies have shown that contributions have a large impact on policy outcomes
by virtue of the access that money can buy. One study concluded that PACs
give money to incumbents in large part to gain access and the influence that
comes with it.246 "Evidence consistent with that hypothesis is that business
groups gave more money to members of the Ways and Means and Commerce
Committees, labor groups targeted contributions to members of the Education
and Labor Committee, and defense PACs heavily supported members of the
National Security Committee. 2 47 These econometric studies thus confirm what
so many states and localities have known and addressed: Money can buy votes,
shape legislative outcomes, and buy access.
3. Buckley Adherence
As state and local governments have responded to the threat to the
republican form of government with campaign finance reform measures, those
efforts have been challenged in court. Not surprisingly, the reaction in court is
clear: As the Sixth Circuit observed, "Any judicial consideration of the
constitutionality of campaign finance reform legislation must begin and usually
ends with the comprehensive decision in Buckley. 2 48 Buckley is the controlling
Supreme Court precedent; accordingly, courts consistently employ the Buckley
First Amendment strict scrutiny framework. But there is not much case-by-case
exploration outside the Buckley box. A typical campaign reform analysis in the
Buckley mold begins with the court exalting campaign spending as political
most recent contribution; correlation and causation are always difficult to distinguish. But the
study does provide stark evidence of the power of campaign contributions in specific situations.
246. See Magee, supra note 245, at 36-37 (positing that PACs give money "to buy
unobservable services that benefit the interest group").
247. Id. at 36. See also Stratmann, Timing, supra note 242, at 132 (finding that farm
interest "campaign contributions are positively related to... membership in the House
Agriculture Committee"); JACKSON, supra note 218, at 323. Author Brooks Jackson noted some
of the results of this system:
The pernicious effect of narrow factions can be seen clearly in the ways Congress
set up housing-subsidy programs that aid wealthy developers more than they help
poor families. It showed itself in a tax code that allowed 'investors' to profit from
coal-mining ventures that mined no coal. It was at work as tax shelter syndicators
grew rich through deals that drained the Treasury without producing any tangible
product.
Id.
248. Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1998). See also Citizens for
Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1186-87 (10th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Kruse); Right to Life of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766, 767
(W.D. Mich. 1998) (same).
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speech, thereby subjecting it to the highest level of First Amendment protection.
49
The courts typically reject limits on expenditures,25° based on the Buckley principle
equating money and speech.2 ' But also underBuckley, some contribution limits have
survived and some have fallen.252 Whether striking or upholding a law, the adherence
to Buckley is strong. Although the corruption rationale does not completely foreclose
the opportunity for any meaningful campaign reform,253 Buckley casts a long shadow.
As explored in this Part, campaign finance reform laws must survive First
Amendment strict scrutiny, and that is very difficult, except when attacking corruption
can be convincingly argued as the legislative goal. But we have also seen that the
states' and localities' efforts to regulate campaigns grow out of a well-founded desire
to protect the republican form of government. While Buckley dictates a First
Amendment analysis, the Guarantee Clause offers an additional perspective. As will
be discussed in Part V, a Guarantee Clause approach can survive Buckley's strict
249. See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that contribution
and expenditure limitations "operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral
to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution." (quoting Buckley
v. Valeo,'424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976))); N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99
F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 1996) (same).
250. See, e.g.,Suster, 149 F.3dat 530; Kruse 142 F.3d at912 (6th Cir. 1998); Gardner,99
F.3d at 18; Frank v. City of Akron, 95 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710 (N.D. Ohio 1999). All of these
cases quote, with alterations, the same language from Buckley:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. But see Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661
(1990) (upholding a prohibition on certain corporate political expenditures).
251. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (noting that Buckley has been so
interpreted).
252. See Frank, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 710 ("A limitation on the amount that a person may give
to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political
communication." (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976))).
253. This corruption rationale applies only to contributions, not independent expenditures:
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.
The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. See also Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 441, 464 (2000) (quoting from
same); Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 615 (1996) (same); Austin, 494 U.S. at 683-84 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); Fed. Elec. Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (same).
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scrutiny. It is time to introduce a new factor, it is time to challenge the conventional
wisdom.
V. Old Problem, Old Clause, New Approach
The Guarantee Clause speaks to the republican form of government, and so does
campaign finance reform. Current analysis fails to consider that connection. How
does the Guarantee Clause help us? This analysis forces a re-examination of the
debate over campaign finance reform that has been dominated by the Bucdey
fiamework for so long. Regardless of one's position on the correctness of the
approach taken in Buckley, it is hard to argue against its impact and dominance. The
problem is that campaign finance reform laws are myopically measured against
Buckley.254 As a result, we have lost sight of why campaign finance reform is
important
The Guarantee Clause approach reminds us that campaign finance reform is not
important as a partisan question of Democrats versus Republicans, but it is
fundamentally important as a matter of the health of the system of government that we
hold so dear in this country. The Guarantee Clause specifically protects that unique
structure--the republic-that is in jeopardy. Thus, employing a Guarantee Clause
framework helps by reorienting the debate to its "true north" position. Although more
recent cases have started to recognize that corruption of the system extends beyond the
quid pro quo of Buckley,2" neither courts nor commentators have ever specifically
addressed this specific, central issue in the debate. Thus, this Article proposes, in
effect, a recentering, so that the core value of the health of the republic is explicitly
considered in any ongoing discussions of campaign finance reform.
This last Part of the Article outlines a role for Congress to animate the debate
over campaign reform by turning to the Guarantee Clause. The federal government
must fulfill the Article IV mandate to guarantee the states a republican form of
government via campaign reform. Congress should pass a law to provide a safe
harbor where a state's action would be analyzed under a Guarantee Clause analysis,
rather than only the First Amendment standards.25 6 But, we cannot ignore the
254. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (listing cases that have adhered to
Buckley).
255. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377,390-95 (2000)
(considering evidence of corruption).
256. This proposal specifically applies so as to have the Congress provide a safe harbor for
campaign reform efforts to the states. It does not apply to the federal government. Still, that
question merits momentary attention. In creating the republic for the United States, the Framers
saw a particular value in protecting the same form of government for the states. They promised
the states that the national government would ensure that the states could enjoy the same
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previous quarter-century of judicial opinions, so we now consider how to clear the
Buckley hurdle.
A. Resolving the Apparent First Amendment Conflict
At this point in this Article, the reader might respond, "So what?" Although
Congress has the power under the Guarantee Clause to enact legislation dealing with
state elections, the First Amendment can be said to tnimp the Guarantee Clause,just as
it could trurp the exercise of any of Congress's enumerated Article I powers. This
response has an intuitive appeal. After all, in constitutional adjudication the Bill of
Rights operates as a limitation on the powers that were entrusted to the national
government by the original Constitution. So long as Buckley is not reconsidered, the
argument concludes, a Guarantee Clause enactment is as subject to invalidation as any
other.257 Several responses suggest that such a conclusion is too facile. We first must
consider that such matters are nonjusticiable, but then assuming justiciability, we will
see that the Guarantee Clause provides a compelling justification for campaign finance
reform that would satisfy constitutional scrutiny. Finally, we will reconsider whether
the Guarantee Clause in a structural way recasts this entire issue so as to justify
congressional action.
1. Procedure: Courts Should Not Hear Guarantee Clause Cases
The first reply invokes the justiciability doctrine.258 Starting with Luther, a long
line of cases hold Guarantee Clause matters nonjusticiable.259 As Guarantee Clause
governmental structure as had been created for the nation. But no such guarantee was created
for the federal government, most logically speaking, because there was no need for such; the
Framers had drafted a document that created a republic, so there was no need to guarantee that
there would be a republican form of the national government-it existed by virtue of the
Constitution. But now that we see the ways in which the republican form of government is
suffering, perhaps there is a need to visit the question in the federal context as well. While it
would be tempting to read a federal Guarantee Clause into the text, by natural implication of the
Framers' original acts, no such text exists. Instead, amending the Constitution so as to add a
federal Guarantee Clause could be one way to achieve this goal. This Article does not propose
such action, but instead raises these ideas for further discussion at another point in time.
257. For recent examples of the application of this principle, see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535
U.S. 564 (2002) (remanding the Children's Online Protection Act, which regulated online
obscenity, to a lower court for further analysis of whether the statute survives strict scrutiny) and
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (overturning federal regulation of
"virtual" child pornography, the Child Pornography Prevention Act).
258. As a procedural question of the courts' ability to even hear a matter, justiciability
should be considered first.
259. See supra Part III.A (documenting the lack of advancement in this area of the law
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matters are political questions, the argument goes, the courts cannot review
such congressional action. If Congress were to act pursuant to Guarantee
Clause authority, courts simply might not hear a challenge to the resulting law.
The nonjusticiability point is also important because it speaks to the structural
role of the various branches in interpreting and enforcing the Guarantee Clause.
In short, Guarantee Clause matters are inherently political by nature-they
involve a definition of what a republican form of government is-and more
specifically, campaign finance reform is a question distinctly political in nature.
The political question doctrine allows for the courts to stay out of areas in
which they do not belong and properly leaves some matters for the expertise of
other branches.
Just as we look back over 150 years to Luther for our Guarantee Clause
foundation, we can also look back even farther, for example, to Marbury v.
Madison,2 ° for the early development of the political question doctrine. "The
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political... can never be made in
this court. '2 61 As we move forward in time, the political question doctrine has
been most famously stated in Baker v. Carr,162 in which the Court set forth six
factors as touchstones in the decision as to whether a matter is a political
question and therefore nonjusticiable, 63 four of which particularly speak to our
situation. The courts would be well-advised against ruling on a Guarantee
Clause campaign finance reform challenge, which would (a) involve a non-
judicial policy determination; (b) disrespect Congress's act; (c) unnecessarily
since Luther's rationale was created).
260. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
261. Id. at170.
262. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
263. The Baker court listed the factors:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings
in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has
one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of
powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
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cleave from a political decision already made by the Congress; and (d) risk
conflicting pronouncements from the two branches.264 Thus, if Congress acts
as proposed in this Article, the matter properly may be seen, judicially
speaking, as a political question that is unreviewable in court.1
6
1
But dicta from Texas v. White cuts against this position: "In the exercise
of the power conferred by the guaranty clause, as in the exercise of every other
constitutional power, a discretion in the choice of means is necessarily
allowed .... [But] no acts [may] be done, and no authority exerted, which is
either prohibited or unsanctioned by the Constitution.2 66 Although it is dicta,
this passage implies that there are limits to the power that the Court can
enforce, and in fact, Congress may not ignore First Amendment limitations
solely because it is acting pursuant to another power. Thus, even adhering to
the established principle that Guarantee Clause matters are nonjusticiable does
not mean that courts will adhere to this judicially-created doctrine.2 67 Thus,
moving beyond justiciability, a First Amendment challenge may still be
available.268
A second reply to the First Amendment challenge builds on the
justiciability argument, but from a perspective of textual context, emphasizing
commands and grants of power. Put most simply, the Guarantee Clause
mandates action, unlike almost any other part of the Constitution: The structure
may be seen as superseding other permissive language. The Guarantee Clause
contains an affirmative mandate to the federal government: "The United States
shall guarantee ... a Republican Form of Government."2 69 This constitutional
provision both grants a power and creates a duty. By contrast, the enumerated
powers in Article I are largely discretionary--Congress is granted various
264. Id.
265. This conclusion suggests what might be called a republican form doctrine that
inveighs for congressional control and against court review of Guarantee Clause matters.
266. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729 (1868). Other Supreme Court precedent
sheds additional light. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) ("[C]ongressional
approval, however well-considered, could hardly validate an unconstitutional state legislative
apportionment. Congress simply lacks the constitutional power to insulate States from attack
with respect to alleged deprivations of individual constitutional rights."). Further, in Baker v.
Carr, the Court addressed what could have been seen as Guarantee Clause claims as Equal
Protection claims, thus avoiding the political question doctrine. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
208-09 (1962).
267. Seen in the light of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), it could be argued that the
current Court might be willing to push aside the political question doctrine as it sees a duty to
intercede.
268. Further, one may argue that the later date of adoption of the First Amendment
necessarily serves as a limitation on whatever came before (i.e., the Guarantee Clause).
269. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).
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powers but not commanded to exercise any of them.270 By determining that
such questions are nonjusticiable, 27' the Court has not only taken itself out of
Guarantee Clause enforcement, it also has reinforced the constitutional
command that Congress must act. On this score, Texas v. White is again
instructive. While it upheld action by the President toward the end of re-
establishing a loyal government in Texas after the Civil War, it expressly
described such actions as "provisional," waiting upon congressional power to
validate them by passing laws.272 The argument, then, is that exercises of the
Guarantee Clause power are nonjusticiable precisely because the judiciary
cannot interfere with the Congress's discharge of its constitutionally imposed
duty.
The Guarantee Clause commands action by Congress. Simultaneously, it
also requires judicial deference (whether in traditional justiciability terms or
not) to such congressional action. The courts thus have yet another reason, in
addition to the long history of nonjusticiability holdings, to decline to hear
Guarantee Clause matters.
2. Substance: There is a Compelling Justification
The first two approaches to the possible First Amendment conflict are
procedural in the sense that they would be raised preliminarily in an attempt to
limit judicial review of the substance of the matter. As judicially created
doctrines, the courts may still ignore them and proceed to the First Amendment
issue itself. Accordingly, the next lines of attack confront the First Amendment
conflict head-on; they are related but different approaches. The next path to
surviving current First Amendment jurisprudence is to find that the Guarantee
Clause, when invoked by Congress to ensure republican government in the
270. In a related vein, the First Amendment contains not a command but a prohibition:
"Congress shall make no law...." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. In contrast, again we see that the
Guarantee Clause provides a rare affirmative obligation for federal action. Cf James E.
Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to
Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U.L. REv. 899, 956 (1997) ("The
constitutional context supplies further evidence that the Petition Clause uses the word
'Government' to carry a three-branch meaning. The Constitution speaks frequently of the
United States; but rarely of the 'government.' The latter term appears but thrice in the whole
instrument as originally framed .... ").
271. See supra Part lI.A (documenting the history of court opinions finding
nonjusticiability on Guarantee Clause cases).
272. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1868) ("The action of the President
must, therefore, be considered as provisional, and, in that light, it seems to have been regarded
by Congress.").
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states, provides a compelling interest to justify an infringement on freedom of
speech. In other words, playing by Buckley's rules, congressional action is
constitutional, because (1) it provides a new compelling interest analysis or
(2) it satisfies the current compelling interest corruption test.
Buckley controls,27 3 and First Amendment scrutiny looms large. 274 But
strict scrutiny, in theory, need not be fatal in fact.275 First, we must identify a
compelling governmental interest. There can be no doubt that acting to protect
the republican form of government is a compelling governmental interest. As
we have seen, the American republic is the Framers' unique contribution to the
world.276 Not only did the Framers build a republic in Articles I, II, and III, but
they also saw it necessary to ensure compatible forms of government in all the
states, even going so far as to mandate federal protection of this form of
government in the Guarantee Clause. In so doing, the Framers were acting out
their belief that the republic would best serve the people, through elected
representatives in the central government.277
Further, moving beyond the Guarantee Clause, other constitutional
provisions embody the textual and structural commitment to the republican
form of government. For example, the text dictates the methods of election of
members of Congress 78 and Senators,279 plus subsequent amendments revised
the provisions for electing Senators.28° The text and amendments further
delineate the method of selection of the President and the Vice President.2 ' In
terms of the exercise of the franchise-the working mechanism of the
republic-the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth
Amendments all protect and extend the right to vote to certain individuals.
282
273. Most courts begin and end their analyses with Buckley. See supra note 248 and
accompanying text (citing cases that have adhered to Buckley). See also supra Parts IV.A.2 and
IV.B.3 (discussing further Supreme Court cases relying on Buckley and cases evaluating state
and local reform efforts within a Buckley standard).
274. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976). See also Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 440
(2001) (recounting the history of strict scrutiny on campaign spending).
275. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
276. See generally supra Part I.
277. See generally supra Part II.
278. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
279. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1.
280. Now Senators are directly chosen. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
281. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2-3; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
282. See supra note 221 (describing the amendments); see also Hartnett, supra note 22 1, at
258-81 (analyzing each amendment).
828
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
In these various ways, the Constitution itself thus speaks to the compelling need
to preserve and protect the republican form.283 Protecting the integrity of the
Framers' creation and the concomitant textual mandate surely is a compelling
governmental interest.
Bringing the matter to the level of specific case law, the Court has
identified other matters that could serve as a compelling interest to justify
campaign reform measures.284 First, Buckley itself identified broad process
concerns as justifying campaign restrictions.285 Other cases also shed light. For
example, in Burson v. Freeman286 the Court upheld Tennessee statutes
prohibiting vote solicitation and limiting the display of campaign materials
within 100 feet of a polling place on Election Day.2 7 As they were specifically
designed to restrict election day political speech, the statutes had to survive
283. Cf Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv. 917, 958-59 (1988)
(discussing other national interests given in Constitution).
284. See id. at 955 ("In order to fully protect this interest in democracy, the Court has
frequently accepted the government's asserted compelling interests in preventing election fraud
and corruption as justifying various restraints on individual rights.").
285. That Court considered the nature of those interests:
The governmental interests sought to be vindicated by the disclosure
requirements ... fall into three categories. First, disclosure provides the electorate
with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is
spent by the candidate in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek
federal office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum
more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and
campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the
voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus
facilitate predictions of future performance in office.
Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance
of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of
publicity. This exposure may discourage those who would use money for improper
purposes either before or after the election. A public armed with information about
a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election
special favors that may be given in return. And, as we recognized in Burroughs v.'
United States, 290 U.S., at 548, Congress could reasonably conclude that full
disclosure during an election campaign tends "to prevent the corrupt use of money
to affect elections. ..
Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure
requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect
violations of the contribution limitations described above.
The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial
governmental interests.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 66-68 (1976) (citation omitted).
286. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
287. Id. at 211.
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strict scrutiny;288 preventing voter intimidation and election fraud were held to
be compelling governmental interests. 289 Bellotti provides another example, as
the Court identified several other interests that lead to the conclusion that
enforcing the Guarantee Clause mandate is compelling. "Preserving the
integrity of the electoral process... and 'sustaining the active, alert
responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of
government' are interests of the highest importance. 2 90 Not only do the post-
Buckley cases offer this support, pre-Buckley case law also had identified the
stability of the system and integrity of the electoral process as compelling
governmental interests.29" ' Guaranteeing the states a republican form of
government serves these same goals.292 Thus, case law supports finding that
campaign regulations preserving the republican form of government can
survive Buckley's scrutiny as serving a compelling governmental interest.
Further, as the republic depends upon the faith of the governed, a
congressional determination that the influence of money on state legislatures is
so severe (whether actual or the appearance thereof) 293 as to undercut the
republican nature of those governments should be determinative of the
question. Congressional amelioration of this problem is a compelling interest.
On top of that, the Constitution, in the Guarantee Clause, places a responsibility
in the hands of the Congress to act to protect the republican form of
288. Id. at 198.
289. Id. at 206.
290. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978) (citations
omitted). Also recall that Bellotti left open the door for factual scenarios that could satisfy
Buckley scrutiny. See supra note 194 (discussing Belotti). See also Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 796 (1983) (considering other election-related interests); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (expressing concern about protecting "the integrity of our system of
representative democracy"). Cf Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 220-222 (1986)
(rejecting the state's desire to prevent voter confusion as a sufficient interest); Democratic Party
of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 124-26 (198 1) (striking down
laws that altered the primary process in the interest of assisting voters).
291. See Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n. 14 (1974) ("Appellants concede,
as we think they must, that the objectives ostensibly sought by the State, viz., preservation of the
integrity of the electoral process and regulating the number of candidates on the ballot to avoid
undue voter confusion, are compelling."); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) ("It
appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State's interest in the
stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but
compelling.... ."); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) ("It is clear that
preservation of the integrity of the electoral process is a legitimate and valid state goal.").
292. See, e.g., supra notes 227-33 (articulating the states' reasons for enacting campaign
finance reform measures).
293. This language deliberately tracks the Buckley analysis of actual or apparent
corruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
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government. As members of the most republican branch, Senators and
Representatives best can identify threats to the republican form-they are
experts.294 Thus, like the political question doctrine suggests, the courts should
particularly respect a congressional determination that the republican form
needs protection, and that determination should form the foundation for
deciding that there is a compelling governmental interest.295 In these various
ways, congressional action to protect a republican form of government should
be held a compelling governmental interest to satisfy Buckley.296
Even taking this issue more narrowly on Buckley's terms, a Guarantee
Clause-based campaign reform proposal would survive Buckley, in that it
would be designed to prevent corruption.297 While the Buckley Court found
corruption to be a compelling justification for enacting campaign finance
reform legislation,298 it considered corruption in a narrow quid pro quo sense.299
It did not fully articulate the vision of corruption of the political process
described in these pages. °° This Article is concerned broadly with the
corruption of the American system of politics and governance, as compared
with the corruption of specific individuals, which can also be addressed directly
through public corruption statutes. 301  Protecting the republican form of
294. And, ironically, they are often the culprits.
295. In a sense, this builds on Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw v. Reno that compliance
with the Voting Rights Act is a "very strong" governmental interest. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 653-54 (1993).
296. Still, any legislation would have to be narrowly tailored, a concern that policy makers
would have to keep in mind while crafting any legislation.
297. While this is a limited form of the Article's main proposition that Congress has a
constitutionally designated power to police the health of the system, suggesting that Congress is
best situated to determine when there is a threat of corruption, the purpose at this point is to
show another way this proposal would fit within the existing legal framework.
298. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. For further discussion of this point, see supra Part
IV.A.I.
299. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,26-27 (1976). The Court cited to several examples of
situations in the Nixon Administration where money was raised specifically to obtain favorable
treatment on specific matters, and to the apparent buying of Ambassadorships through campaign
finances. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussing the
relationship of corruption, campaign finance, and public confidence in government), affd, 424
U.S. I (1976).
300. Another way to put this point is that a congressional campaign finance reform
enactment under Guarantee Clause authority-this Article's proposal-would not pose a direct
conflict with Buckley. This Article thus offers an alternative analysis for those who want to
respect the precedential value of Buckley. Recall Justice O'Connor's famous line in Casey:
"Liberty finds no refuge in ajurisprudence of doubt." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 844 (1992).
301. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (providing penalties for those who give or offer, solicit or
receive anything of value in return for influence in official acts).
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government may be directly equated with preventing corruption, not on the
micro level, but rather on the macro level. The Court has indicated a
willingness at least to consider this perspective in some more recent cases. In
Shrink Mo., for example, the Court held that corruption "extend[s] to the
broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors. 30 2  Thus, either by analyzing the compelling interest of
guaranteeing a republican form of government, or by looking at the corruption
rationale itself, a Guarantee Clause approach to campaign finance reform would
withstand a Buckley challenge,
303
3. Structure: Alternative Approach
A final, more radical approach to the Buckley dilemma is to reframe the
First Amendment issue and consider the structural importance of the Guarantee
Clause. Consider the one person, one vote principle, a° which, like our
situation, involves political and governmental structures, state-federal relations,
and seminal constitutional principles. As the Court made clear in Reynolds,
"Malapportionment can, and has historically, run in various directions.
However and whenever it does, it is constitutionally impermissible under the
Equal Protection Clause. 30 5 But, it would be ludicrous to bring suit to re-
structure the United States Senate30 6 in conformity with the one person, one
302. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). The
Austin Court interpreted corruption as including "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and
that have little or no correlation to the public's support." Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). See also Overton, Mistaken Identity, supra note 169, at
1267 n. 139 (considering the interpretations of "corruption or the appearance thereof').
303. One might respond that the case law in this field has always considered the type of
broad systemic corruption that this Article addresses, thus nothing new emerges with the
Guarantee Clause analysis. No doubt, the subtext of a corrupt political system runs under both
the "traditional" campaign finance reform case law and this new analysis. But the important
difference in this context is that the Guarantee Clause analysis has never been considered
before, and in doing so, we explicitly confront the deterioration of the republican form of
government in a way that has never explicitly been considered in case law or scholarship.
304. See, e.g., Lucas v. Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 737 (1964) (holding a
Colorado apportionment unconstitutional even though the voters had approved it); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545-46 (1964) (finding unconstitutional an Alabama election system which
overweighted rural voters); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (finding that Federalist
57 mandated "one person, one vote"); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (same as
Reynolds, for Georgia system).
305. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567 n.43.
306. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. I (stating that each state shall have two Senators, each
with one vote, regardless of population variations from state to state).
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vote principle. The Electoral College is similarly implicated in this analysis.a 7
These two structural creations of the Constitution run afoul of the one person,
one vote principle,308 but they have survived. Structural provisions that might
otherwise be seen to contravene the Bill of Rights can, and do, withstand strict
309scrutiny. Why? Because, viewed as structural components of government,
they are unlike exercises of power. The structure created by the Constitution
thus arguably supersedes the individual rights delegated in the Bill of Rights.
From this perspective, the Guarantee Clause is simply not subject to the
same First Amendment restrictions as other government action. While not
"structural" in the same sense as Articles I, II, and III in establishing basic
governmental institutions, the Guarantee Clause protects the underlying
republican structure of the entire enterprise. The republican form of
government is the heart and soul of the Constitution; the Guarantee Clause
requires the United States to protect this structure. Perhaps it is even more
important as the guarantor and guardian of the entire structure. While the First
Amendment certainly applies to political speech, it does not apply so as to
307. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § I (providing for the appointment of Electors); U.S. CONST.
amend. XII (creating and detailing function of Electoral College, which utilizes malapportioned
voting scheme based on House and Senate representation).
308. Many people have challenged the Electoral College for just such a reason. See
generally Victor Williams & Alison M. Macdonald, Rethinking Article II, Section I and its
Twelfth Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation's Malapportioned, Undemocratic
Presidential Election Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 201 (1994); Roberta A. Yard, American
Democracy and Minority Rule: How the United States Can Reform Its Electoral Process to
Ensure "One Person, One Vote", 42 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 185 (2001); Ky Fullerton, Comment,
Bush, Gore, and the 2000 Presidential Election: Timefor the Electoral College to Go?, 80 OR.
L. REv. 717 (2001).
309. In Reynolds, the Court justified these two institutions:
The system of representation in the two Houses of the Federal Congress is one
ingrained in our Constitution, as part of the law of the land. It is one conceived out
of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of our federal
republic. Arising from unique historical circumstances, it is based on the
consideration that in establishing our type of federalism a group of formerly
independent States bound themselves together under one national government ....
In rejecting an asserted analogy to the federal electoral college in Gray v.
Sanders... we stated: We think the analogies to the electoral college, to
districting and redistricting, and to other phases of the problems of representation
in state or federal legislatures or conventions are inapposite. The inclusion of the
electoral college in the Constitution, as the result of specific historical concerns,
validated the collegiate principle despite its inherent numerical inequality, but
implied nothing about the use of an analogous system by a State in a statewide
election.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574-75 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1962)).
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thwart this Guarantee Clause approach to campaign finance reform." ° To
elevate the values of unlimited campaign expenditures as expressive activity
while the republican form of government disintegrates is akin to fiddling while
Rome bums. The structure of government must be protected, or the protection
of the individual from the excesses of government becomes rather meaningless
form over substance. Thus, we see yet another way to resolve the apparent
Buckley conflict.31" '
As we approach the end of the Article, a brief review is in order. We have
seen that popular sovereignty is at the heart of the republican form of
government; the people reign supreme, and representatives in the central
government act in the best interest of all the people-the many, not the few.
312
The Guarantee Clause provides an affirmative obligation for the United States,
acting through the political branches, to protect the republican form in the
states.313 Congress bears the responsibility-and has exercised it-to enforce
the Clause, and the courts defer to the legislative branch.314 We have also seen
that the republican form of government is in danger, threatened by the corrosive
influence of money in politics.3"' As attempts have been made to remedy this
problem, the courts have employed the Buckley First Amendment strict scrutiny
framework.31 6 Now is the time for Congress to act pursuant to Guarantee
Clause authority; the last subpart showed that congressional action in this area
pursuant to the Guarantee Clause could withstand strict scrutiny.3" 7 Thus, the
key point of this Article has been established: Congress must act-and may do
so within constitutional boundaries-to help the states with campaign finance
reform, as an exercise of Guarantee Clause power. Now, we consider how that
can happen.
310. The value of political speech is being diminished more surely by the destruction of the
republican form of government than by any single restriction on the mechanics of campaigns
and elections. As the process is distorted by the ability of the few to disproportionately
influence the elected representative, the republic is in danger.
311. In this context-an argument in the alternative---core First Amendment values
ultimately would be strengthened by this approach to campaign reform rather than weakened.
See also Chemerinsky, supra note 44 (arguing that the Guarantee Clause protects individual
rights).
312. See supra Part 11 (considering the essence of the America republic).
313. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
314. See supra Part Ill (discussing judicial deference on Guarantee Clause issues).
3 15. See supra Part IV.B. 1-2 (reporting the measurable effect of money in politics and the
failed efforts to lessen this problem).
316. See supra Parts IV.A.1-2 and IV.B.3 (discussing Buckley's continued application).
317. See supra Part V.A (considering how a reform measure passed under the Guarantee
Clause would stand up to strict scrutiny).
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B. A Proposal for Congressional Action
The states have attempted to guarantee the integrity of their republican
governments, but the courts have struck down these efforts under a First
Amendment analysis. 318 In order to fulfill its constitutional obligation to
guarantee the states a republican form of government, Congress should pass a
law empowering the states to enact meaningful campaign reform. Although
courts should have input into this matter, the Guarantee Clause envisions
deference to the legislative branch-courts should defer to Congress as to the
meaning of a republic and what it takes to have a republican form of
government.
To illustrate, here are the outlines of a campaign reform law for the United
States Congress to offer the states a safe harbor and congressional assistance in
regulating their own campaigns. It would proceed in two major sections. The
first part of the legislation would contain three congressional declarations.
First, Congress would simply and succinctly state that it is acting pursuant to its
Guarantee Clause obligation. Second, the law would spell out the central
features of a republican form of government 3'9 and indicate how this ideal is
being subverted by the reality of today's system.320 Third, the law would
explain the connection between the republican form of government and
campaign reform.32' With these three steps, Congress effectively would declare
why this is a matter for its attention pursuant to the Guarantee Clause. The law
would then turn to the mechanics of how to restore and/or preserve the
republican form of government at the state level.
The specifics of a law are to be left to the Congress, which the
Constitution most trusts to enforce the Guarantee Clause. Congress should
decide the best way to guarantee the states a republican form of government,
and the courts should defer to that decision. But, Congress is not entirely
unfettered in its discretion. Primarily, to the extent that the influence of large
money contributions has the effect of diminishing the government's
responsiveness to the majority of the people, any Guarantee Clause-sponsored
legislation would at least have to have a firm foundation in that reality in order
to fall within the Guarantee Clause's grant of power. As members of Congress
318. See supra Part IV.B.3 (reporting the failure of new reform efforts to pass the Buckley
test).
319. See supra Part If (considering nature of a republic).
320. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing corrosive effect of money on political
system).
321. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B. 1-2 (discussing corrosive effect of money on political
system).
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carry out their duty in this area, they must be guided by the principles embodied
in the Guarantee Clause, such as those delineated in this Article. In other
words, as we move forward, we must remain mindful of how we got here. The
means chosen by Congress to assist states with campaign finance reform in
order to preserve their republican governments must be consonant with the
principles of republican governance. Further, the means chosen must meet the
McCulloch-like standard, which again is appropriately deferential to
Congressional decisions.322
There are two guiding principles by which we 323 can judge Congress's
choice of means to protect the states. The broad principle driving this
discussion is that the power of money has had a corrupting effect on the
political-governmental system. Two intertwined ideas should inform any
Congressional response: expenditures and contributions. 324 First, campaigns
cost enormous sums of money, and the dollar amount is increasing rapidly. So,
Congress would act appropriately in furtherance of its Guarantee Clause
mandate by assisting the states to reduce the costs of campaigning. Measures
like providing free airtime for candidates' advertisements and debates, 325 or
offering a franking privilege for candidate mailings would be examples of
measures that might help achieve such a goal.326
Second, the other side of the coin is raising the money to spend-because
candidates will need to raise money. The problem we have identified in large
part results from the fact that some well-financed groups and individuals gain
322. See, e.g., supra notes 88, 126, 152 and accompanying text (discussing McCulloch and
its ramifications).
323. We the people can keep a check, and the President and members of the judiciary
branch can also do so.
324. Note also that, contrary to Buckley, expenditures and contributions cannot be looked
at separately as though unrelated one to the other.
325. The federal government could leverage its FCC licensing power to require
broadcasters and cable operators to condition licenses on the provision of a certain amount of
airtime for participating candidates' advertisements. But see Kathleen Q. Abernathy, My View
From the Doorstep of FCC Change, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 199, 203 (2002) (I consider proposals
like the push for free political ads ill-conceived .. "); Rebecca R. Reed, Free Air Time:
Campaign Finance Reform or Constitutional Violation?, 18(2) COMM. LAW. 21, 25-26 (2000)
(arguing that such a proposal would be unconstitutional).
At present, candidates are protected from price gouging by the stations. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(b) (2000) (disallowing higher-than-normal rates for campaign advertisements). For a
discussion of the role of debates in the presidential selection process, see generally Mark C.
Alexander, Don't Blame the Butterfly Ballot: Voter Confusion in Presidential Politics, 13
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 121 (2002). The same provisions could be made applicable to radio as
well. The federal government also could subsidize mailings for candidates via the United States
Postal Service, at no cost to the campaign.
326. These are merely illustrative, not exhaustive, policy suggestions.
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access because of their financial capabilities, while the average citizen is not
heard. Toward that end, Congress would be acting to further its Guarantee
Clause mandate by helping reduce that gap. Related measures could include
contribution limits, matching funds, and public financing.327 This Article does
not propose a detailed legislative proposal-Congress is constitutionally
entrusted with that task. But the details must be judged against the driving
principles laid out in these pages to reduce the corrosive impact that money has
on the political-governmental process.328 If Congress acts pursuant to its
Guarantee Clause mandate, then the means chosen must be measured against
the specific ends of the Clause itself as explored earlier.
At this point, the states would take the lead within parameters set by
Congress. They would design their campaign reform measures and turn to the
Congress for help, which the federal government would provide. 29 States
desiring assistance would benefit in several ways. First, Congress would
provide federal funds for state campaign activities. Second, while money helps,
the federal government could help drive down the overall cost of campaigns.
Third, states would then have a greater ability to attempt bolder reforms like
contribution ceilings, expenditure limits and soft money bans. Above all, the
mechanics are left up to the federal elected officials, for they are entrusted with
preserving the republican form. Based on this basic outline, the states would
design plans as they see fit, and Congress would support their actions, pursuant
to the Guarantee Clause mandate.
If Congress acts along these lines, then the states would be able to opt in to
meaningful campaign reform.33° There are no penalties for not doing so, but
327. There could be straight funding or matching funding. For example, for every dollar
the candidate raises from individuals, the federal government would provide one to four dollars
in matching funds. Cf NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 3, § 3-705(2) (200 1)
(creating a quadrupling matching fund system), http://www.nyccfb.info/programlaw/cflaw/
cfact/cfactchap7.htm#705. In addition, federal funding could be made available to the states to
pay for certain political activities, including conventions, get-out-the-vote drives and other
broad appeal activities. In this way, candidates could spend less time raising money as there
would be funding provided to the political parties and candidates.
328. On the other side, any limits will be judged by the same basic criterion of whether
they appropriately further (and not whether they are the best or most narrowly tailored means)
the goals of guaranteeing a republican form of government.
329. In a sense, this would be akin to the state government making application to the
United States for help, pursuant to part of Article IV that we have not discussed in these pages:
"The United States shall ... on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive, [protect the
States] against domestic Violence." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
330. This voluntary structure avoids problems of state autonomy and commandeering that
were rejected in the Tenth Amendment context in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See also Merritt, Republican
Governments, supra note 45, at 816 ("If Congress tells state legislatures to enact a particular
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there are great rewards. Beyond the financial and more tangible federal
assistance, the states would benefit because once Congress declares its actions
to fall under the Guarantee Clause mandate, the resulting laws would arguably
be insulated from attack, or more to the point, the analysis would change.
Although Buckley would still provide the key analytical reference point, any
court challenge also would have to confront the Guarantee Clause issue.
This proposed law would represent Congress's efforts at enforcing the
Guarantee Clause, with the federal and state governments working together.
The key point is that without campaign reform, the republican form of
government is in jeopardy. The states have sponsored their own laws,"3I which
are often stricken under Buckley analysis.332 The United States has an
obligation to the states, under Article IV, Section 4, to help them preserve their
republican form of government. Campaign reform can do the job, and
Congress must provide a safe harbor for the states to act.
VI Conclusion
The heart of the American republic is popular sovereignty-the people are
supreme, and their political will is done in the central government by duly
elected representatives. In the republic, the people must have control of their
choices-not simply by being able to vote, but by having the government act in
their best interest. Toward that end, the representatives owe their best
judgment to all members of the community. Today, the increased influence of
the few is diminishing the responsiveness of the representative to the many.
The republican form of government is in jeopardy. The Guarantee Clause
mandates federal government action to protect the republican form of
government.
333
law, and the states must comply, then the state legislatures become slaves of an outside power
rather than servants of their electorate."). This Article's proposal does not run up against
Merritt's state autonomy concern, in that Congress would allow states to enact their statute at
their will without federal interference, and then the states' actions would be immune from
challenge.
331. See supra Part IV.B.2 (documenting various state and local reform efforts).
332. See supra Part IV.B.3 (reporting that those efforts usually fail to meet Buckley's
standard).
333. This Article has proposed a new approach to campaign reform, with particular
inspiration and support from the Guarantee Clause. The specific proposal just set forth likely
would achieve results and would certainly challenge the established thinking in the area. But
beyond that, simply accepting the basic role of the Guarantee Clause in this area could have
other ramifications. In particular, there is a question of federal court enforcement to consider
briefly.
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
The states have experimented with campaign finance reform in order to
place power back in the hands of the people. But, the field of campaign finance
reform has proceeded under limited Buckley analysis that does not address a
central moving force behind campaign finance reform. The Guarantee Clause,
which has rested in relative obscurity for nearly two centuries, is directly
relevant to this discussion, and it should be used to revive the debate over
campaign finance reform. Such congressional action would fulfill the
Constitution's mandate and would survive a Buckley challenge. While offering
a basic plan of action for the Congress, I hope even more broadly to animate a
debate that yearns for creative attention. We should reconsider campaign
reform as something central to the American republic; future analysis should
take the Guarantee Clause perspective into account. It is time for the United
States to fulfill its obligation to the states.
The language of the Guarantee Clause places a specific obligation on the federal
government and unless and until Congress acts, the courts might play a role to fulfill that
obligation. Thus, when a federal court next faces a challenge to campaign finance legislation, it
might weigh the Guarantee Clause in determining whether to uphold the challenged law. Thus,
one final implication of this Article is that perhaps the courts should analyze state campaign
finance reform laws under the Guarantee Clause. Further development of the merits or
shortcomings of this idea is best left for a later time.

